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BOARD TO DEATH: HOW BUSY  
DIRECTORS COULD CAUSE THE  
NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
JEREMY C. KRESS* 
Abstract: In the aftermath of the Great Recession, shareholders and regula-
tors expect financial institution boards of directors to play an active role in 
risk management. To date, however, shareholders, policymakers, and academ-
ics have ignored a critical shortcoming: the directors of the United States’ 
largest financial institutions are too busy to fulfill their governance responsi-
bilities. Many financial institution directors hold full-time executive positions, 
and most serve on the board of at least one other company. Although these 
outside commitments provide important learning and networking opportuni-
ties, they also contribute to cognitive overload and limit the time that directors 
spend assessing strategy and risk. This Article argues that overcommitted di-
rectors impair the governance of large financial institutions. These firms, by 
virtue of their complexity and systemic importance, require enhanced risk 
monitoring that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. Nonetheless, the 
boards of many large financial institutions remain alarmingly overcommitted. 
Through a series of case studies—including Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts 
scandal and JPMorgan’s London Whale trades—this Article explores how 
busy directors inhibit oversight of management, increase the risk of firm fail-
ure, and could cause the next financial crisis. This Article proposes a series of 
reforms to alleviate director overcommitment and thereby enhance the stabil-
ity of the financial system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The winter of 2012 was a busy time for James Crown. As the lead in-
dependent director of Sara Lee Corporation,1 Crown began the year by con-
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 1 See Sara Lee Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Sept. 15, 2011). 
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ducting a search to replace Sara Lee’s CEO and overseeing a spin-off of 
half of Sara Lee’s business lines.2 Meanwhile, defense contractor General 
Dynamics Corporation—where Crown also served as lead independent di-
rector—was scrambling to cope with $1 trillion in congressionally mandat-
ed defense budget cuts.3 At the same time, Crown—the grandson of a 
wealthy industrialist—managed stakes in the Chicago Bulls, New York 
Yankees, Rockefeller Center, and the Aspen ski resort as president of his 
family’s multi-billion dollar investment company.4 
As if those responsibilities were not enough, Crown also served on the 
board of the largest financial institution in the United States, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. (“JPMorgan”).5 Crown, in fact, occupied a crucial role on 
JPMorgan’s board—he chaired the Risk Policy Committee (“RPC”), which 
was in charge of overseeing significant risks facing the firm.6 
JPMorgan’s winter proved to be eventful. A trader in the firm’s London 
office began amassing risky credit derivatives.7 The trader’s position soon 
dominated the market—rival firms started referring to him as the “London 
Whale.”8 Neither the RPC nor JPMorgan’s risk management systems, how-
ever, detected the escalating risk within the company.9 While Crown attend-
ed to crises at Sara Lee and General Dynamics, the market turned against 
JPMorgan’s now-massive derivatives position. Just weeks before Crown 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Melissa Korn & Ilan Brat, Sara Lee to Split into Two Public Companies, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 29–30, 2011, at B4; Emily Bryson York, Sara Lee Hires Soup Exec to Lead MeatCo, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 7, 2012, at 10; see also Associated Press, Sara Lee Chief Is Leaving After a Stroke, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/business/10saralee.html [https://
perma.cc/TM8E-TLWT]. 
 3 See General Dynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10, 18 (Feb. 17, 2012); General 
Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7 (Mar. 16, 2012); see also Marjorie Censer, 
Defense Contractors’ Earnings Down as Pentagon Makes Cuts, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/defense-contractors-earnings-down-as-
pentagon-makes-cuts/2012/01/24/gIQAicBlaQ_print.html [https://perma.cc/37L9-PL7T] (quoting 
General Dynamics’ CEO warning that the company is “bracing for significant change” as a result 
of cuts). 
 4 See Melissa Harris, JPMorgan Board Members Targeted: Advisory Firms Recommend 
Shareholders Reject Re-election After ‘London Whale,’ CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2013, § 2, at 1 (not-
ing that Crown signs off on all of his family’s major investment decisions and oversees the man-
agement of all Crown family businesses); Luisa Kroll, The Forbes 400, FORBES, Oct. 11, 2010, at 
88 (describing the Crown family’s investments). 
 5 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 4 (Apr. 4, 2012). 
 6 See id. at 9. 
 7 For a detailed discussion of JPMorgan’s trading loss, see infra notes 181–221 and accompa-
nying text. For further background, see Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and 
Shareholder Empowerment, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 655–59 (2015); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: 
An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629, 1636–39 (2014). 
 8 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN 
CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 25 (Comm. Print 
2013) [hereinafter SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT]. 
 9 See id. at 153. 
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finalized Sara Lee’s spin-off,10 JPMorgan publicly disclosed billions of dol-
lars of losses on the London Whale trades.11 
America’s boardrooms are filled with directors who, like Crown, serve 
as board members or executives of other firms.12 Shareholders believe that 
leaders of other companies will be strong contributors in the boardroom.13 
Directors with many affiliations—the conventional wisdom goes—are more 
effective because they acquire valuable knowledge and practice by serving 
in governance capacities at other firms.14 As a result, director candidates 
who sit on many corporate boards or serve as full-time executives are in 
high demand among the United States’ largest companies.15 
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that more is better 
when it comes to directors’ professional commitments. To the contrary, this 
Article argues that other board seats and outside employment limit a direc-
tor’s availability, contribute to cognitive overload, and thereby diminish the 
director’s effectiveness. Drawing on psychological principles and empirical 
evidence, this Article demonstrates that overcommitted directors withdraw 
from corporate decision making, tend not to challenge management, and 
experience attention shocks that distract them from company business.16 
This Article’s key insight is that the drawbacks of director busyness are 
especially severe for large, complex financial institutions because of the 
special governance demands imposed on their boards. In contrast to nonfi-
nancial firms, financial institutions’ unique combination of high leverage 
and short-term funding can trigger sudden liquidity crises that spread rapid-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Press Release, Hillshire Brands Co., The Hillshire Brands Company Announces Com-
pletion of Spin-off and Payment of Special Cash Dividend (June 28, 2012), http://www.business
wire.com/news/home/20120628006413/en/Hillshire-Brands-Company-Announces-Completion-
Spin-off-Payment [https://perma.cc/3SLQ-KJSK]. 
 11 See Dan Fitzpatrick et al., J.P. Morgan’s $2 Billion Blunder, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at 
A1. JPMorgan ultimately incurred $6.2 billion in losses and more than $1 billion in fines for inad-
equate risk monitoring. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 12 (Nov. 8, 2012); 
Danielle Douglas, CFTC Will Fine JPMorgan $100 Million in ‘Whale’ Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 
17, 2013, at A17. 
 12 See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Johan S.G. Chu & Gerald F. Davis, Who Killed the Inner Circle? The Decline of the 
American Corporate Interlock Network, 122 AM. J. SOC. 714, 720 (2016) (“[D]irectors sitting on 
many boards gain[] broad-based business intelligence . . . thus making them attractive as codirec-
tors.”). 
 14 See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 
689, 690 (2006) (“There is a growing literature that shows that serving on multiple boards can be a 
source of . . . valuable experience . . . for outside directors.”). 
 15 See SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD INDEX 10, 14 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX], https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/
ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AN2-DV34] (finding that more than half of new S&P 500 
directors have prior board experience and more than half are “active senior executives and profes-
sionals”). 
 16 See infra notes 76–129 and accompanying text. 
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ly to other firms through interconnectedness and contagion.17 Shareholders 
and regulators, therefore, expect financial institution directors to implement 
and oversee monitoring systems to detect misconduct and excessive risk-
taking.18 Enhanced risk monitoring, however, is precisely the type of over-
sight that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. 
This Article assesses the drawbacks of director busyness through case 
studies of Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal and JPMorgan’s Lon-
don Whale trades. In both cases, key directors who were overextended with 
outside commitments inhibited oversight and prevented the firms from re-
sponding more effectively to nascent risks. A third case study of PNC Fi-
nancial Group (“PNC”), by contrast, demonstrates how directors who were 
unusually focused on their governance responsibilities helped PNC emerge 
as one of the biggest winners of the financial crisis. To be clear, this Article 
does not argue that directors with fewer outside commitments necessarily 
would have averted misconduct at Wells Fargo and JPMorgan. Rather, this 
Article contends that directors who were less busy would have been more 
likely to detect and deter wrongdoing. 
Recognizing the risks of overcommitted directors, the European Union 
(“EU”) has adopted regulations limiting outside employment and board 
seats for directors of large, complex financial institutions.19 The United 
States, however, does not restrict board members’ professional engage-
ments. Alarmingly, the directors of the largest and most complex U.S. fi-
nancial institutions rank among the country’s busiest board members.20 For 
example, nearly two-thirds of Citigroup’s independent directors serve on 
three or more public company boards.21 This Article concludes that, absent 
policy reforms, overcommitted financial company boards will hinder over-
sight of management, increase the risk of firm failure, and perhaps cause the 
next financial crisis. 
This Article contributes to the growing literature on corporate govern-
ance and board composition in four distinct ways. First, this Article applies 
psychological principles to assess how directors’ outside commitments af-
fect their governance abilities. Second, this Article uses original case stud-
ies to advance the novel claim that director overcommitment is especially 
detrimental for large, complex financial institutions—firms whose miscon-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 48–63 and accompanying text.  
 18 See infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.  
 19 The EU’s rules are part of Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”). Directive 
2013/36/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to the 
Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment 
Firms, art. 91.3, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 385 [hereinafter CRD IV]. See infra notes 285–291 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the EU’s rules. 
 20 See infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 45–58 (Mar. 15, 2017). 
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duct or excessive risk-taking could inflict harm on the broader economy. 
Third, this Article asserts that a financial institution’s key directors—
namely, its lead independent director and the chairs of its risk and audit 
committees—should significantly limit their outside commitments because 
they bear special responsibility for overseeing the institution’s risk. Finally, 
this Article explains why private ordering, on its own, will not sufficiently 
restrain director overcommitment, and it proposes specific reforms to safe-
guard the financial system.22 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores corporate governance 
generally and the role of the board of directors, focusing on the unique chal-
lenges of corporate governance in financial firms. Part II examines how direc-
tor busyness affects corporate governance, drawing on psychological princi-
ples and existing empirical evidence. Part III presents original case studies 
analyzing how director busyness impairs the governance of large, complex 
financial institutions. Part IV provides evidence that the boards of many U.S. 
financial companies remain troublingly overcommitted. Part V offers recom-
mendations for alleviating the problem of director overcommitment. 
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
A. The Dual Roles of the Board 
The board of directors plays a central role—indeed, the central role—
in U.S. corporate governance.23 As Berle and Means taught, agency prob-
lems arise when managerial control is separated from corporate ownership, 
as is the case in large, public companies.24 Unchecked by dispersed share-
holders, who lack the incentive and ability to supervise the corporation, 
management might pursue ill-advised strategies or enrich themselves with 
corporate funds.25 A board helps alleviate these agency problems by central-
izing control of the corporation in a group of shareholder-elected directors 
who are vested with plenary authority to govern the firm.26 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 250–297 and accompanying text. 
 23 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BRO-
KEN 51 (2008) (“The board of directors is at the epicenter of U.S. corporate governance.”). 
 24 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 5–7 (1932); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304–05 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
 25 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 24, at 304 (“Without effective control procedures, . . . deci-
sion managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of residual claim-
ants.”). 
 26 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
47 (2012) (“[T]he board of directors serves as one of the chief constraints on the problem . . . [of] 
agency costs.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017) (providing that “[t]he business 
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Boards of directors have traditionally fulfilled their governance re-
sponsibilities in two ways.27 First, boards of directors serve an advising 
role, using their expertise to provide strategic guidance to the firm’s man-
agement.28 Although management is responsible for the day-to-day opera-
tion of the firm, directors acting in their advisory capacity “consult[] with 
management regarding the . . . operational direction of the company.”29 For 
instance, directors may counsel management about new product offerings, 
geographic expansion, potential merger and acquisition activity, and other 
significant strategic decisions.30 
Second, boards of directors serve a monitoring role. In their capacity 
as monitors, directors oversee management to ensure that managers execute 
their responsibilities faithfully and effectively.31 Directors evaluate the per-
formance of the firm’s CEO and other senior-level management, set the 
CEO’s compensation, and terminate the CEO when necessary.32 
Tensions invariably arise between a board’s advising and monitoring 
duties.33 As monitors, directors experience conflicts of interest when evalu-
ating decisions in which they participated as advisors.34 More subtle con-
                                                                                                                           
and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of 
directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, rev. ed. 2016) (“[T]he busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the 
oversight, of its board of directors.”). 
 27 See, e.g., DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 67 (2011) (identifying 
advising and monitoring as a board’s two primary duties); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Demythifica-
tion of the Board of Directors, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 131, 134 (2015) (“Boards are commonly said to 
both monitor and advise management.”). 
 28 See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 
798 (2011) (“[T]he board performs an advisory function, offering advice and opinions to man-
agement about general business concerns.”); Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A 
Review and Research Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409, 424 (1996) (“[O]ne of the more prevalent func-
tions of directors is to advise and support the CEO . . . .”). 
 29 LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 27, at 67. 
 30 See generally Brown, supra note 27, at 159–60 (describing directors’ advising role). 
 31 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 160–61 (2008) (discussing directors’ monitoring role). 
 32 LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 27, at 68. Directors, of course, serve other roles in addition 
to advising and monitoring. Politically connected board members, for instance, could help the 
company obtain government contracts or assist the company in achieving its public policy objec-
tives. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 49. Directors affiliated with financial institutions help 
the corporation obtain outside sources of funding. See id. In addition, directors facilitate infor-
mation sharing among the firm’s stakeholders. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three 
Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (1996). Directors also help re-
solve disputes among the firm’s stakeholders. See Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Me-
diating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 298–300 (2015). 
 33 See Tamar Frankel, Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors?, 77 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 501, 502–04 (2008). 
 34 Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 
928–29 (2010). 
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flicts arise when directors develop relationships with management and be-
come psychologically invested in their success.35 Board “capture” inhibits 
directors from vigorously monitoring management.36 It may be untenable, 
therefore, for directors to serve equally as advisors to and monitors of man-
agement.37 
Perhaps to reconcile these tensions, boards of large, public corpora-
tions have, over time, largely abandoned their advising role and instead fo-
cused on monitoring.38 In response to shareholder pressure and regulatory 
requirements, companies have dramatically increased the proportion of in-
dependent directors comprising their boards in the last several decades.39 
This shift away from manager-directors reflects shareholders’ and policy-
makers’ preferences for directors who primarily monitor, rather than advise, 
management.40 
At the same time, recent legal decisions and industry codes of conduct 
have enhanced directors’ monitoring responsibilities. A director’s monitor-
ing role, it is now commonly recognized, extends beyond mere oversight of 
the firm’s top-level management.41 Indeed, in In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized di-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 57 (“The problem with boards is their unique susceptibility 
to capture by the managers they are supposed to monitor.”). 
 36 See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and 
the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 25–31. 
 37 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 54 (arguing that it is “unreasonable to expect directors to 
perform both [advising and monitoring] functions simultaneously because there is a fundamental 
and irreconcilable conflict between the monitoring function and the management function”). 
 38 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Cor-
porate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2014) (“The role of the typical public corporation 
board shifted from a mainly advisory function in the 1970s to an emphasis by the late 1990s on 
active and independent monitoring of the top management team.”); Brown, supra note 27, at 163 
(“The boards of the largest public companies do not perform an advisory role, at least in any sys-
tematic or meaningful fashion. . . . Instead, directors mostly ensure legal sufficiency and establish 
outer boundaries for management.”); Fisch, supra note 34, at 929 (“Corporations largely have 
sacrificed the potential value of managing boards in favor of the independent monitoring board.”); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Share-
holder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2007) (“[F]rom the post-
World War II era to the present. . . . the board’s principal role shifted from the ‘advising board’ to 
the ‘monitoring board’ . . . .”). 
 39 See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1465 (noting that the percentage of independent directors on 
large public company boards increased from 20% in 1950 to 75% in 2005); see also Yaron Nili, 
The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 106–12 
(2016) (assessing the shareholder- and regulatory-driven reasons for the increase in independent 
directors). 
 40 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 54–55 (“[A] board structure that emphasizes independent 
directors reflects a corporate governance policy of favoring monitoring over managing . . . .”); id. 
at 55 (“[T]he U.S. board structure . . . reflects an implicit policy choice promoting a monitoring 
corporate governance paradigm rather than an advising corporate governance paradigm.”). 
 41 See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (char-
acterizing the board’s duty to monitor as “an obligation to prevent harm to the corporation”). 
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rectors’ duty to implement and oversee, on an ongoing basis, effective en-
terprise-wide risk monitoring systems.42 The Business Roundtable’s Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance reinforce that a board of directors is respon-
sible for “[s]etting the company’s risk appetite, reviewing and understand-
ing the major risks, and overseeing the risk management processes.”43 The 
effectiveness of board-level risk oversight, moreover, is a key consideration 
in the Department of Justice’s determination of whether to charge a corpora-
tion with criminal wrongdoing and in subsequent sentencing decisions.44 
Thus, management remains the first line of defense against risks, but direc-
tors have taken on an increasingly significant role in monitoring and re-
sponding to risks throughout the firm.45 
B. Financial Firms Are Special 
Risks associated with financial markets pose unique corporate govern-
ance challenges.46 Financial institutions differ from nonfinancial firms in at 
least three key respects: (1) they are opaque and highly leveraged with short-
term debt, (2) they benefit from government support, and (3) their actual or 
                                                                                                                           
 42 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 43 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 2016, at 7 (2016), https://
businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/79JN-ZDVS]; see also TIM ARMOUR ET AL., COMMONSENSE PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2016), http://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
GovernancePrinciples_Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/94LQ-H9HH] (noting directors’ responsi-
bilities to focus on “significant risks, including reputational risks”). 
 44 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) 
(providing that a company’s board of directors must “exercise reasonable oversight” of its compli-
ance and ethics programs in order for the company to receive a reduced sentence); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-
28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.300 [https://perma.cc/45WZ-
27NJ] (identifying “the existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance 
program” as a factor to be considered in determining whether to charge a corporation). 
 45 See Stephen J. Lubben, Separation and Dependence: Explaining Modern Corporate Gov-
ernance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 900 (2013) (“This is not to say that the board is the corpo-
ration’s risk and compliance manager. That power belongs with management. The directors 
should determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite . . . and satisfy themselves that the risk 
management processes designed and implemented by managers are consistent with the company’s 
goals.”); Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. FO-
RUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 17, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/
12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-2/ [https://perma.cc/89BH-ML9J] (“[T]he risk 
oversight function of the board of directors—has taken center stage . . . and expectations for board 
engagement with risk are at all-time highs.”). 
 46 See Frank Partnoy, Delaware and Financial Risk, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018) (manu-
script at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958893 [https://perma.cc/
7YEU-Y6UC] (arguing that “financial risk is categorically different”). See generally David Min, 
Balancing the Governance of Financial Institutions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 743 (2017) (discuss-
ing financial institutions’ unique governance problems). 
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perceived instability may trigger systemic externalities. These characteristics 
have important implications for the way financial firms are governed.47 
1. Differences Between Financial and Nonfinancial Firms 
Financial firms are more opaque and more highly leveraged with short-
term debt than their nonfinancial counterparts. Opacity—information asym-
metries between a financial company’s risk-takers and other stakeholders—
makes it difficult for a firm’s shareholders, creditors, and even its directors to 
monitor the firm’s asset quality and trading risks.48 A financial institution’s 
margin for error is smaller because financial companies tend to be funded 
with a greater proportion of debt relative to nonfinancial firms.49 Many finan-
cial firms rely primarily on short-term debt, which creditors may withdraw 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. Midyear Meeting: Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation (June 9, 
2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140609a.htm [https://perma.cc/
8PYV-AGHF] (“The risks associated with financial intermediaries . . . pose a particular challenge 
for corporate governance.”); see also Renée Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance 
Different for Bank Holding Companies?, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 123, 124 
(“The governance of banking firms may be different from that of unregulated, nonfinancial firms 
for several reasons.”); Kose John et al., Corporate Governance in Banks, 24 CORP. GOVERNANCE 
303, 304 (2016) (“[B]anks have special features that intensify governance problems and might 
reduce the effectiveness of standard governance mechanisms.”); Hwa-Jin Kim, Financial Regula-
tion and Supervision in Corporate Governance of Banks, 41 J. CORP. L. 707, 709 (2016) (“The 
corporate governance of banks has always been treated differently than general corporate govern-
ance due to the special nature of the banks . . . .”). 
 48 See Marco Becht et al., Why Bank Governance Is Different, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 
437, 438 (2011) (“Banks have the ability to take on risk very quickly, in a way that is not immedi-
ately visible to directors or outside investors.”); Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Corporate 
Governance in Finance: Concepts and International Observations, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOV-
ERNANCE: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 17, 29–35 (Robert E. Litan et al. 
eds., 2002) (discussing the opacity problem in banking and implications for corporate govern-
ance); Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks?, 5 ANN. REV. FIN. 
ECON. 63, 67 (2013) (“Banks are more opaque than the typical nonfinancial firms because of large 
informational asymmetries surrounding loan quality . . . . Trading activities may also make banks 
more opaque than nonfinancial companies without such activities. . . . because trading positions 
and associated risk profiles can be easily changed in real time. . . .”); see also Viral V. Acharya et 
al., Corporate Governance in the Modern Financial Sector, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 185, 185 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 
2009) (“Unlike in industrial firms, it has become increasingly difficult for infrequently meeting 
boards to fully grasp the swiftness and forms by which risk profiles of [large, complex financial 
institutions] can be altered by traders and securities desks.”). 
 49 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FRB-
NY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 91, 97 (“Although it is not uncommon for typical manufac-
turing firms to finance themselves with more equity than debt, banks typically receive 90 percent 
or more of their funding from debt.”); see also John et al., supra note 47, at 304 (“[T]he average 
leverage of banks, measured as the ratio of debt to assets, is between 87 and 95 percent, whereas 
the average leverage of nonfinancial companies is in the range of 20–30 percent.”) (internal cita-
tion omitted). 
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with little warning.50 This unique combination of opacity, high leverage, and 
short-term funding can trigger sudden liquidity and solvency crises.51 
Second, in contrast to nonfinancial companies, many financial institu-
tions benefit from explicit or implicit government guarantees. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and, if necessary, the U.S. Treas-
ury insure bank and thrift depositors against losses, up to a statutory limit.52 
State guaranty funds provide similar protection to insurance policyhold-
ers.53 In times of crisis, however, the government has repeatedly bailed out 
uninsured depositors and other financial institution creditors, creating the 
expectation that the government will step in even when not required to do 
so.54 Government backing of financial institutions puts the public fisc at 
stake.55 Even more critically for purposes of corporate governance, explicit 
and implicit government guarantees reduce incentives for depositors and 
other creditors to monitor a financial institution’s risk-taking.56 Creditors of 
nonfinancial firms typically exert some level of control over the firm’s risk 
profile by entering into debt covenants or, if necessary, refusing to roll over 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Laeven, supra note 48, at 67 (“[M]uch of the debt held by banks is short-term, whereas 
assets tend to be longer-dated. Such maturity transformation exposes banks to liquidity risk and 
bank runs . . . .”). 
 51 See Tarullo, supra note 47 (“All firms bear the risk that problems may unexpectedly arise 
because of, say, product flaws . . . . But in the case of financial intermediaries, these problems can 
be incredibly fast-moving; including runs on funding that can quickly place the very survival of 
the firm in doubt.”). 
 52 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012) (providing that FDIC shall insure depositors up to 
$250,000 per ownership account category, per depositor, per institution); see also id. § 1824(a)(1) 
(providing the FDIC authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury Department, as needed). 
 53 See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON, & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 351 (2016) (describing system of state-based insurance guaranty 
funds). 
 54 See, e.g., id. at 250–52 (discussing implicit guarantees of uninsured depositors and short-
term wholesale creditors). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) limited the government’s authority to extend guarantees to uninsured credi-
tors but did not completely eliminate it. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 1105, 12 U.S.C. § 5612 
(2012) (prohibiting the FDIC from issuing broad-based guarantees of bank debt unless authorized 
by a joint resolution of Congress); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (permitting the FDIC, with 
the concurrence of the Federal Reserve and Secretary of the Treasury, to guarantee an institution’s 
uninsured deposits if failing to do so would “have serious adverse effects on economic conditions 
or financial stability”). 
 55 See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF 
THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 51 (2011) (estimating that the federal government guar-
anteed at least $4.4 trillion of financial assets under emergency programs at the peak of the finan-
cial crisis). 
 56 See Caprio & Levine, supra note 48, at 36 (“Deposit insurance reduces the incentives of 
depositors (and any other creditors who believe the government insures their claims) to monitor 
banks and thus directly hinders corporate governance.”); see also BARR ET AL., supra note 53, at 
248 (“Deposit insurance dampens depositors’ incentives to monitor their banks’ performance 
because the depositors are indemnified against loss even if risky activities lead to failure.”). 
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their loans.57 In the presence of explicit or implicit guarantees, however, 
financial institution creditors do not impose market discipline as effectively 
because they know they are protected from losses.58 
Finally, financial companies are unique in that interconnectedness and 
contagion create systemic externalities.59 Financial and nonfinancial firms 
alike impose losses on their shareholders and creditors when they fail. Fi-
nancial companies are different, however, because their instability has the 
potential to trigger serious knock-on effects.60 Counterparties, for instance, 
may incur catastrophic losses when a financial institution defaults on its 
obligations.61 A financial institution’s actual or perceived insolvency, more-
over, can cause not only that firm’s creditors to withdraw funding but also 
other firms’ creditors to run on their banks.62 Thus, as the recent crisis 
demonstrated, poorly managed financial firms can paralyze not only the 
entire financial system but also the real economy.63 
2. The Unique Role of a Financial Institution Board 
These characteristics impose unique demands on a financial institu-
tion’s board of directors to establish effective risk monitoring systems with-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See, e.g., Caprio & Levine, supra note 48, at 22 (discussing market discipline by creditors 
in a generic model of corporate governance). 
 58 See Tarullo, supra note 47 (“[I]n traditional, deposit-reliant banks . . . market discipline 
associated with . . . creditor monitoring will be attenuated. . . . [T]o the degree uninsured deposi-
tors or other bank creditors expect that they will be protected by the government in the event the 
bank encounters serious difficulties, those same features of market discipline will again be weak-
ened.”); see also Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Bank Corporate Governance: A Proposal 
for the Post-Crisis World, 20 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Aug. 2016, at 85, 88 (“The moral haz-
ard caused by deposit insurance . . . leads not only to excessive risk taking by banks but also to an 
industrywide reduction in levels of monitoring within the firm, resulting in a higher incidence of 
large losses and bank failures caused by fraud.”). 
 59 Andreas Kokkinis, A Primer on Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institu-
tions: Are Banks Special?, in THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 1, 2–3 (Michael 
McKee ed., 2015) (“Profit maximisation necessarily entails taking substantial risks that, even if 
desirable from the point of view of bank shareholders, may still be excessive from the society’s 
perspective, due to the systemic consequences of crises in any major bank. This problem is not 
unique to the banking sector, but is far more severe in banks than in other large companies . . . .”). 
 60 See HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYS-
TEM FROM PANICS 5–11 (2016). 
 61 See Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
Am. Econ. Ass’n/Am. Fin. Ass’n Joint Luncheon: Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons 
from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/yellen20130104a.htm [https://perma.cc/339S-XFMY] (discussing counterparty 
risk). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 389–401 (2011) (describing economic consequences of financial 
crisis). 
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in the firm.64 Reflecting this imperative, shareholders expect a financial in-
stitution’s board to play an active role in preventing misconduct and exces-
sive risk-taking.65 
Moreover, financial company boards have traditionally been subject to 
special legal and regulatory requirements to monitor risks within their firms.66 
These risk-monitoring obligations exceed the relatively low bar established in 
Caremark.67 All bank holding company (“BHC”) boards, for instance, are 
subject to supervisory mandates to understand and address the key market, 
operational, compliance, and legal risks within their firms.68 More stringent 
risk-monitoring standards apply to the boards of the largest and most complex 
financial firms. For example, the Federal Reserve requires directors of com-
panies engaged in an expanded range of financial activities to be “forward-
looking and active participants in managing risk.”69 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Tarullo, supra note 47 (“[T]he information and monitoring processes and systems es-
tablished for . . . boards of financial institutions may need to be more extensive than those in large, 
nonfinancial firms.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. 
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 15, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/02/15/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-4/ [https://perma.cc/Y4TF-APP2] (“Ma-
jor institutional shareholders and proxy advisory firms now evaluate risk oversight matters when 
considering withhold votes in uncontested director elections and routinely engage companies on 
risk-related topics.”). By one estimate, employee misconduct has destroyed more than $850 billion 
in profits at the top fifty global banks since the Financial Crisis. See BENJAMIN QUINLAN ET AL., 
VALUE AT RISK: A LOOK AT BANKING’S USD 850 BILLION BEHAVIOURAL PROBLEM 4 (2017), 
http://www.quinlanandassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Quinlan_Associates-Value-
At-Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JH-VY4T]. 
 66 See Partnoy, supra note 46, at 5 (asserting that financial company directors are held to 
“significantly higher standards” than non-financial company directors). 
 67 See id. at 5–6. 
 68 See BD. GOVS. FED. RES. SYS., SR 95-51 (SUP), RATING THE ADEQUACY OF RISK MAN-
AGEMENT PROCESSES AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AT STATE MEMBER BANKS AND BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES (1995) [hereinafter RISK MANAGEMENT RATING PROCESSES], https://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1995/sr9551.htm [https://perma.cc/W9EL-MTSQ] (“Boards of di-
rectors have ultimate responsibility for the level of risk taken by their institutions. . . . [A]ll boards 
of directors are responsible for understanding the nature of the risks significant to their organiza-
tions and for ensuring that management is taking the steps necessary to identify, measure, monitor, 
and control these risks . . . .”); see also id. (“Directors of large banking organizations that conduct 
a broad range of technically complex activities . . . . should . . . have a clear understanding of the 
types of risks to which their institutions are exposed and should receive reports that identify the 
size and significance of the risks . . . .”); BD. GOVS. FED. RES. SYS., SR 16-11 (SUP), SUPERVI-
SORY GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING RISK MANAGEMENT AT SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS WITH TO-
TAL CONSOLIDATED ASSETS LESS THAN $50 BILLION (2016), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1611.htm [https://perma.cc/VDD2-XFEL]. The Federal Re-
serve has proposed to revise the supervisory expectations for boards of directors of BHCs with 
more than $50 billion in assets. See infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 69 Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,444, 70,450 (Dec. 6, 2004) (estab-
lishing criteria for a BHC to receive a “strong” risk management rating); see also 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(l)(1)(C) (2012) (providing that a BHC must be “well managed” to engage in expanded 
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Following the financial crisis, policymakers imposed new risk-monitor-
ing requirements on the boards of directors of financial institutions. The 
Dodd-Frank Act, for instance, directs all BHCs with more than $10 billion in 
assets to maintain a risk committee on its board of directors that is responsible 
for the enterprise-wide risk-management practices of the company.70 The risk 
committee must oversee a risk-management framework that includes pro-
cesses and systems for “identifying and reporting risks” and “ensuring effec-
tive and timely implementation of actions to address emerging risks.”71 
In August 2017, the Federal Reserve proposed new guidance that pur-
ports to strengthen supervisory expectations for directors of the largest U.S. 
banks.72 The proposal reflects the Federal Reserve’s view that financial 
company directors should spend more time on their core, risk-related re-
sponsibilities.73 In particular, the proposal emphasizes that directors are re-
sponsible for overseeing senior management, holding them accountable for 
effective risk management and compliance, guiding the development of the 
firm’s strategy and risk tolerance, and supporting the stature and independ-
ence of the firm’s risk management and audit functions.74 
Directors of financial companies, in sum, have special risk management 
responsibilities. While most large, public company boards have increased 
emphasis on their monitoring responsibilities,75 risk monitoring is particularly 
                                                                                                                           
financial activities); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s) (2017) (providing that a BHC is well managed if it re-
ceives at least a satisfactory risk management rating). 
 70 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h). 
 71 12 C.F.R. § 252.33(a)(2). 
 72 Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectation for Boards of Directors, 82 Fed. Reg. 
37,219 (Aug. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Proposed Guidance]. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell 
has said that the proposal would “increas[e] the focus on” and “upgrad[e]” the expectations for 
financial institution directors. John Heltman, How Much Should a Bank Board Know?, AM. BANKER 
(Aug. 24, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-much-should-a-bank-board-
know [https://perma.cc/Z87T-E77A] (quoting Gov. Jerome Powell). Some scholars, however, 
argue that the proposal would loosen requirements for directors. See, e.g., Letter from Anat Ad-
mati et al., to Ann E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Comments on the 
Proposed Guidance on Supervisory Expectations for Boards of Directors (Dkt. No. OP-1570) and 
Proposed Rulemaking on Large Financial Institution Rating System; Regulations K and LL (Dkt. No. 
R-1569) (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2018/February/20180220/OP-1570/
R-1569_021518_131970_286783407465_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/387Q-W8YW] (“[T]he proposed 
changes would be a step backwards for the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial system 
. . . .”). 
 73 See Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
the Large Bank Directors Conference: The Role of Boards at Large Financial Firms (Aug. 30, 
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20170830a.htm [https://perma.
cc/N8YS-N7T3] (“The intent is to enable directors to spend less board time on routine matters and 
more on core board responsibilities . . . .”). 
 74 See Proposed Guidance, supra note 72, at 37, 224–26. 
 75 See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
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important for financial company directors due to the unique characteristics of 
their firms. 
II. WHY DIRECTOR BUSYNESS MATTERS 
The increased emphasis on risk monitoring for public company 
boards—and especially for boards of large, complex financial institutions—
raises a question as to whether directors are equipped to fulfill their govern-
ance responsibilities. Drawing on psychological principles and empirical 
research, this Part explores the effect of directors’ outside professional 
commitments on their governance abilities. 
A. The Psychology of Busyness 
By any measure, public company directors lead exceptionally busy 
lives. More than half of new independent directors of S&P 500 firms, for 
example, are actively employed as corporate executives or in other profes-
sions.76 Most directors, moreover, serve on the board of at least one other 
public company.77 Many directors also serve on private company boards, 
nonprofit boards, councils, or advisory groups.78 Examples of extraordinari-
ly busy directors abound.79 In 2015, for instance, former AOL, Inc. CEO 
Jonathan Miller served as a director of eight publicly traded companies, sat 
on the board of eleven private companies and nonprofit organizations, and 
held a day job as a partner in a venture capital company.80 
In general, there are two ways in which a director’s outside profession-
al commitments might affect his or her governance abilities. On one hand, 
outside engagements could enhance a director’s effectiveness. Directors 
might acquire valuable knowledge and practice by serving in governance 
capacities at other companies. Outside engagements are opportunities for 
                                                                                                                           
 76 SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 14 (reporting that 53% of new 
S&P 500 independent directors in 2017 were active senior executives or other professionals). 
 77 Id. at 16 (reporting that the average S&P 500 director serves on 2.1 public company 
boards). 
 78 See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 44–58 (Mar. 15, 2017) (de-
scribing Citigroup’s directors’ nonprofit and private company board service). 
 79 See, e.g., Joan S. Lublin, How Many Board Seats Make Sense?: Inside America’s Board-
rooms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2016, at B1 (noting that former U.S. congressman Richard Gephardt 
served on five public company boards while spending more than sixty hours per week running his 
own consulting and lobbying firm); Mark Rogers, When Directors (Like Gregory Maffei) Serve on 
Too Many Boards, FORBES (July 31, 2014, 2:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleader
shipforum/2014/07/31/when-directors-like-gregory-maffei-serve-on-too-many-boards/#16227dc
86ae2 [https://perma.cc/Z6UT-VES5] (discussing Liberty Media CEO Gregory Maffei’s service 
on seven public company boards). 
 80 See Todd Wallack & Sacha Pfeiffer, Debate Swirls on Multiple Directorships: Critics Say 
Too Many Can Sap Energy, Weaken Challenges to Executives, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2015, at A1. 
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the director to sharpen his or her oversight skills, refine decision-making 
processes, and observe what governance practices succeed or fail at other 
organizations.81 Professional engagements also broaden a director’s net-
work and enable the director to facilitate strategic partnerships or suggest 
other strong director candidates.82 
On the other hand, however, a director’s outside commitments could 
detract from his or her governance responsibilities. Director workloads have 
increased substantially since the early 2000s.83 Directors now devote, on 
average, more than twenty hours per month to each board on which they 
serve.84 Time commitments are even higher for board chairs, lead independ-
ent directors, and directors who chair board committees.85 Directors with 
many professional engagements, therefore, might lack time to carefully re-
view reports, assess strategy and risk, and attend board and committee 
meetings for all of the companies with which they are affiliated.86 
In addition to imposing time constraints, outside commitments could 
restrict a director’s cognitive capacity. Psychologists long ago established 
that humans suffer from innate cognitive limitations.87 Working memory, 
for example, can store only a finite amount of information.88 Even if direc-
tors had unlimited time, the “limited capacity of the human information-
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with 
Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 1089 (2003). 
 82 See Ira C. Harris & Katsuhiko Shimizu, Too Busy to Serve? An Examination of the Influ-
ence of Overboarded Directors, 41 J. MGMT. STUD. 775, 777 (2004) (surveying literature on ben-
efits of multiple directorships). 
 83 See James S. Linck et al., The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, 3306 (2009) (finding 
“dramatic increase in directors’ workload” following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002). 
 84 NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRS., 2016–2017 NACD PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2 
(2016), https://www.nacdonline.org/files/2016–2017%20NACD%20Public%20Company%20Gover
nance%20Survey%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRM-S4LP] (noting in the 
executive summary that the average public company director spends 245 hours per year on board 
business).  
 85 See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 43, at 12. 
 86 See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance, 39 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 669, 691 (2015) (“Sitting on many boards could also result in directors who are so 
busy that they cannot give sufficient attention to any given firm. At a certain point, board mem-
bers might be too busy to conduct their monitoring role diligently and effectively.”). 
 87 See, e.g., George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits 
on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 81–83, 95–96 (1956) (dis-
cussing limitations on humans’ capacity to retain information in working memory); see also Nel-
son Cowan, The Magical Number 4 in Short-term Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental Storage 
Capacity, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 87, 94–108 (2000) (providing evidence of even stricter ca-
pacity limits). 
 88 See Earl K. Miller & Timothy J. Buschman, Working Memory Capacity: Limits on the 
Bandwidth of Cognition, 144 DÆDELUS 112, 112–14 (2015) (reviewing evidence of working 
memory capacity limits). 
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processing system” might cap the number of enterprises that a director can 
effectively understand, monitor, and advise.89 
The psychological literature, moreover, suggests that busy directors are 
particularly susceptible to a variety of situational factors that could further 
impair their cognition. Divided attention and distractedness, for example, 
have been shown to diminish executive functioning, memory, and work-
place performance.90 Burnout from stressful or time-consuming jobs like-
wise impairs cognition.91 Sleep deficits, which are widespread among cor-
porate directors,92 weaken critical cognitive functions that directors need to 
succeed in their roles.93 Age-related cognitive declines, moreover, exacer-
bate these limitations.94 Age-related impairments may be especially worri-
some, as the average age of corporate directors continues to climb.95 
Finally, psychological biases may blind corporate executives to their 
cognitive limitations, preventing self-regulation of their workloads. Indeed, 
the Dunning-Kruger Effect is a cognitive bias whereby individuals consist-
ently overestimate their own abilities and underestimate their limitations.96 
Highly skilled and highly educated people are particularly vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Harris & Shimizu, supra note 82, at 777. 
 90 See, e.g., Catherine D. Middlebrooks et al., Selectively Distracted: Divided Attention and 
Memory for Important Information, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1103, 1103 (2017); Joshua S. Rubinstein et 
al., Executive Control of Cognitive Processes in Task Switching, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
763, 774–90 (2001); Edward M. Hallowell, Overloaded Circuits: Why Smart People Underper-
form, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2005, at 55. 
 91 See, e.g., Pavlos Deligkaris et al., Job Burnout and Cognitive Functioning: A Systematic 
Review, 28 WORK & STRESS 107, 113 (2014); I.H. Jonsdottir et al., Cognitive Impairment in Pa-
tients with Stress-Related Exhaustion, 16 STRESS 181, 188–89 (2013). 
 92 ‘Epidemic’ of Sleep Deprivation Spreads Among Busy Britons, DAILY MAIL (May 1, 2007, 
12:50 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-451760/Epidemic-sleep-deprivation-spreads-
busy-Britons.html [https://perma.cc/P24Y-3F2J] (reporting that company directors were the most 
sleep-deprived in a survey of more than five thousand individuals from thirty different careers). 
 93 See, e.g., Adrienne M. Tucker et al., Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Dissociated Compo-
nents of Executive Functioning, 33 SLEEP 47, 54–55 (2010); Vinod Venkatraman et al., Sleep 
Deprivation Elevates Expectations of Gains and Attenuates Response to Losses Following Risky 
Decisions, 30 SLEEP 603, 607–08 (2007); Matthew P. Walker & Robert Stickgold, Sleep, Memory, 
and Plasticity, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 139, 160 (2006). 
 94 See generally Timothy Salthouse, Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines, 63 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 201 (2012) (discussing the effects of aging on cognition and workplace 
functioning). 
 95 The average age of independent directors on S&P 500 boards has risen from sixty to sixty-
three years since 2002. See SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 9; SPENCER 
STUART, 2012 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 8 (2012) [hereinafter SPENCER STUART 2012 
BOARD INDEX] (on file with author). 
 96 See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1132 (1999) (“[P]eople tend to hold overly optimistic and miscalibrated 
views about themselves.”); see also David Dunning et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their 
Own Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 83 (2003) (“[P]eople are not 
adept at spotting the limits of their knowledge and expertise.”). 
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misjudging their own abilities.97 In one of the most common manifestations 
of the Dunning-Kruger Effect, individuals regularly overestimate their abil-
ity to balance many tasks at once.98 Thus, ignorant of their cognitive limita-
tions, directors may take on more professional obligations than they can 
competently handle. 
In sum, notwithstanding a busy director’s talent and intelligence, time 
restrictions and cognitive limitations may prevent the director from under-
standing several complex, multinational corporations well enough to govern 
them effectively. 
B. Market-Wide Empirical Evidence 
It is not immediately obvious from the foregoing theoretical discussion 
whether the governance-enhancing effects of outside professional engage-
ments outweigh the negative consequences of busyness, or vice versa. To 
assess which effect predominates, this Section draws on empirical studies 
that have analyzed how director busyness influences firm performance and 
risk across a wide variety of industries. At first glance, these studies appear 
to yield contradictory results. 
In one of the earliest studies on director busyness, Professor Stephen 
Ferris et al. found no evidence that busy directors are associated with worse 
financial outcomes.99 To the contrary, Ferris et al. detected a positive, alt-
hough statistically insignificant, association between director busyness and 
firm performance in a sample of more than three thousand publicly traded 
firms.100 Ferris et al., in addition, found that shareholders perceive the ap-
pointment of busy outside directors as value enhancing. Indeed, firms in 
their study experienced positive stock market returns after appointing a new 
director who held three or more board seats.101 This study, in sum, suggests 
that directors with multiple professional affiliations are more effective 
board members. 
Professors Eliezer Fich and Anil Shivdasani, by contrast, concluded in 
another study that busy directors are associated with weak firm perfor-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Katherine A. Burson et al., Skilled or Unskilled, but Still Unaware of It: How Percep-
tions of Difficulty Drive Miscalibration in Relative Comparisons, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 60, 71 (2006) (finding that skilled test subjects predict their performance on difficult 
tasks less accurately than unskilled subjects). 
 98 See Jason R. Finley et al., Metacognition of Multi-Tasking: How Well Do We Predict the 
Costs of Divided Attention?, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 158, 158 (2014) (“[P]eople . . . have 
little metacognitive insight on the extent to which they are personally vulnerable to the risks of 
divided attention . . . .”). 
 99 Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1088. 
 100 Id. at 1101–02 (finding that a firm’s market-to-book ratio is positively correlated with the 
average number of directorships held by its outside directors). 
 101 Id. at 1101–03. 
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mance.102 Analyzing Forbes 500 firms, Fich and Shivdasani detected a 
strong link between busy directors and worse financial outcomes. They 
found that firms in which at least half of the independent directors held 
three or more board seats had market-to-book ratios 4.2% lower than other 
firms, as well as significantly lower return on assets.103 Further, sharehold-
ers in Fich and Shivdasani’s sample reacted negatively when directors took 
on many outside commitments. Indeed, the announcement of a director ac-
cepting his or her third board seat resulted in negative abnormal stock mar-
ket returns for the other firms where the director served.104 Overall, these 
results support the view that busy directors detract from effective corporate 
governance.105 
These two early studies present a puzzle: why did Ferris et al. and Fich 
and Shivdasani reach contradictory results? Professor George Cashman et al. 
resolved the discrepancy in a subsequent study.106 Noting that Fich and 
Shivdasani analyzed Forbes 500 firms while Ferris et al. used a sample com-
prised primarily of smaller firms, Cashman et al. hypothesized that director 
busyness is more detrimental for larger firms than smaller firms.107 This ex-
planation is intuitively appealing. Smaller, less established firms might bene-
fit from busy directors’ connections and experience,108 while larger, more es-
tablished firms might require more intense monitoring that busy directors are 
unable to provide.109 To test their hypothesis, Cashman et al. analyzed the 
effects of director busyness using two samples—one comprised of S&P 500 
firms and the other comprised of non-S&P 500 firms. They found statistically 
significant evidence that busy directors detract from firm performance for 
S&P 500 firms but enhance performance for non-S&P 500 firms.110 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 14, at 721. 
 103 Id. Fich and Shivdasani, like Ferris et al. and nearly all other governance studies, take into 
account membership on public company boards but not private company boards. See id. at 695. 
Public company board seats are a common proxy for director busyness because the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires publicly traded companies to disclose other public company 
boards on which their directors sit. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e)(2) (2017). 
 104 Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 14, at 719–20. 
 105 Id. at 722 (“[O]ur results suggest that boards relying heavily on outside directors that serve 
on several boards are likely to experience a decline in their quality of corporate governance.”). 
 106 George D. Cashman et al., Going Overboard? On Busy Directors and Firm Value, 36 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 3248 (2012). 
 107 Id. at 3249. 
 108 See Laura Field et al., Are Busy Boards Detrimental?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 65 (2013) 
(“IPO firms’ demands for advising exceed their demands for monitoring, and thus, IPO firms will 
garner greater benefits from busy directors than will seasoned firms.”). 
 109 See id. at 73 (“[T]he complexity and lower levels of managerial ownership among [Forbes 
500] firms might lead them to require more monitoring, which, due to time constraints, busy direc-
tors are arguably less equipped to provide.”). 
 110 Cashman, supra note 106, at 3252 (“Tobin’s Q is inversely related to the presence of busy 
directors for S&P 500 firms, consistent with Fich and Shivdasani (2006). However . . . for the 
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Further studies have confirmed that busy directors generally detract 
from firm performance111 and that the drawbacks of director busyness are 
more severe for larger firms.112 Researchers have determined that busy di-
rectors are associated with a lower return on assets,113 decreased market 
value,114 and deeper diversification discounts.115 These studies verify that 
the negative relationship between busy boards and firm performance holds 
across a wide range of time periods and industries.116 Several studies, 
moreover, establish that busy directors are not merely correlated with, but 
actually cause, decreased firm performance.117 These studies suggest that 
                                                                                                                           
non-S&P 500 firms, the opposite is true—that is, consistent with the Ferris et al. (2003) findings, 
there is a positive association between busy directors and Tobin’s Q.”). 
 111 See LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 27, at 153 (finding that studies on director busyness 
“yield consistent and convincing results: [c]ompanies with busy boards tend to have worse long-
term performance and worse oversight” than firms whose directors have fewer professional en-
gagements); Christophe Volonte, Boards: Independent and Committed Directors?, 41 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 25, 27 (2015) (“Most empirical studies on multiple directorships find that there is a 
negative relationship with firm performance.”). 
 112 See Field et al., supra note 108, at 73 (concluding that busy boards are associated with 
higher market-to-book ratios for S&P 1500 firms but lower market-to-book ratios for Forbes 500 
firms); Stephen P. Ferris et al., Better Directors or Distracted Directors? An International Analysis 
of Busy Boards 17–21 (Aug. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3012820 [https://perma.cc/Z3LE-SUXN] (finding that busy directors 
detract from firm value and profitability for all but the youngest firms in a sample of more than 
54,000 global companies); see also Curtis Clements et al., The Impact of Company Size and Mul-
tiple Directorships on Corporate Governance Effectiveness, 12 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERN-
ANCE 354, 363–67 (2015) (concluding that busy directors benefit smaller companies but not larger 
companies). 
 113 See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3254 (finding a negative association between direc-
tor busyness and return on assets in S&P 500 companies); Ferris et al., supra note 112, at 20–21 
(finding a negative association between director busyness and return on assets in a sample of more 
than 54,000 global companies). See generally John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief 
Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999) (finding a 
negative association between director busyness and return on assets in sample of large, publicly 
traded U.S. companies). 
 114 See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3254 (finding a negative association between direc-
tor busyness and Tobin’s Q—the ratio of a firm’s market value relative to its total assets—in S&P 
500 companies); Ferris et al., supra note 112, at 17–20 (finding a negative association between 
director busyness and market-to-book ratio in a sample of more than 54,000 global companies). 
 115 See Pornsit Jiraporn et al., Multiple Directorships and Corporate Diversification, 15 J. 
EMPIRICAL FIN. 418, 425–32 (2008) (concluding that boards of industrial firms in which at least 
50% of outside directors hold three or more directorships suffer deeper diversification discounts). 
 116 Compare Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3250–54 (studying non-financial and non-
utility companies from 1999–2008), with Core, supra note 113, at 377, 388 (studying firms in 
fourteen industries from 1982–1984). 
 117 Cashman et al., for instance, find that one-to-three year lagged values of director busyness 
are correlated with lower firm performance. See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3253. Fich and 
Shivdasani use a similar lagging technique and find a negative association between lagged values 
of director busyness and firm performance. See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 14, at 703–05. This 
approach confirms that director busyness causes poor performance because “director busyness in 
prior years could not have been caused by the firm’s [performance] in subsequent years.” Cash-
2018] The Risks of Overcommitted Financial Institution Directors 897 
three total boards is the threshold at which directors’ professional commit-
ments begin to detract most strongly from their governance abilities.118 
The empirical evidence points to three behaviors by busy directors that 
lead to weaker firm performance. Specifically, busy directors impair corpo-
rate governance because they are (1) less likely to participate in corporate 
decision making, (2) less likely to challenge management, and (3) subject to 
attention shocks that draw focus away from company business. 
First, busy directors are less inclined to participate actively in corpo-
rate decision making. Busy directors, for example, are more likely to miss 
board meetings119 and are less likely to serve on board committees.120 Cru-
cially, board committees meet less frequently when their members have 
                                                                                                                           
man et al., supra note 106, at 3254. Using another approach to control for endogeneity, a separate 
study finds that exogenous reductions in directors’ professional commitments lead to increases in 
firm performance. See Roie Hauser, Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mer-
gers, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2945206 [https://perma.cc/3DGZ-6GVF] (finding that an exogenous reduction in a 
director’s professional commitments—i.e., the termination of an outside directorship by merger or 
acquisition—is associated with increases in earnings and market-to-book ratios for the firms with 
which the director remains affiliated). Exogenous increases in directors’ workloads, meanwhile, 
are associated with decreases in firm performance. See generally Antonio Falato et al., Distracted 
Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 404 (2014) (finding 
a long-term reduction in market value when an S&P 1500 firm’s director sits on the board of an-
other firm that experiences an “attention shock”—i.e., the sudden death of a co-director or CEO 
that necessitates the director’s increased attention on the affected firm). These findings thus help 
resolve the issue of causality and provide strong support that busy directors detract from firm 
performance. 
 118 See, e.g., Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3255 (“[T]he negative association between 
busy directors and firm performance is strongest when the definition of busy is a director serving 
on three or more boards.”). 
 119 See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Do Directors Perform for Pay?, 46 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 154, 161–62 (2008) (finding that directors holding a higher number of outside board seats 
are more likely to miss board meetings); Pornsit Jiraporn et al., Too Busy to Show Up? An Analy-
sis of Directors’ Absences, 49 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 1159, 1164–65 (2009) (same). 
 120 See Pornsit Jiraporn et al., Ineffective Corporate Governance: Director Busyness and 
Board Committee Memberships, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 819, 823 (2009) (finding that directors 
who sit on three corporate boards serve on fewer board committees relative to other directors); see 
also Kevin D. Chen & Andy Wu, The Structure of Board Committees 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 17-032, 2016), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-032_22ea
9e7a-4f26-4645-af3d-042f2b4e058c.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP9J-9H4M] (concluding that busy 
directors are less likely to serve on multiple committees). But see Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 
1103–05 (finding that directors with three or more public company board seats serve on more 
committees than directors with fewer board seats). 
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many outside professional commitments,121 and fewer committee meetings 
are associated with worse financial outcomes.122 
Second, busy directors tend not to challenge management. As a result, 
firms with busy directors are more susceptible to managerial self-dealing, 
misconduct, and excessive risk-taking. Firms with busy directors, for exam-
ple, are less likely to replace underperforming CEOs123 and are more likely 
to overpay their CEOs.124 Busy directors, moreover, are more likely to be 
associated with severe governance problems, including bankruptcies, major 
litigation, regulatory violations, and major accounting restatements.125 Fur-
ther, companies in which outside directors hold a greater number of board 
seats are more likely to commit accounting fraud.126 Corporate misconduct 
is particularly prevalent when key directors—such as committee chairs—
are busy.127 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See, e.g., Vineeta Sharma, Determinants of Audit Committee Meeting Frequency: Evi-
dence from a Voluntary Governance System, 23 ACCT. HORIZONS 245, 258–59 (2009) (finding 
that audit committees meet less frequently when members of the committee hold multiple direc-
torships). 
 122 See Francesca Battaglia & Angela Gallo, Risk Governance and Asian Bank Performance: 
An Empirical Investigation Over the Financial Crisis, 25 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 53, 66 (2015) 
(finding a positive relationship between a firm’s market value and the frequency of its risk com-
mittee meetings in a sample of Asian banks); cf. Hugh Grove et al., Corporate Governance and 
Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks, 19 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 418, 431 (2011) (finding positive association between board meeting frequency 
and financial performance among U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis). 
 123 See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 14, at 722 (“CEO turnover is completely insensitive to 
firm performance when a majority of outside directors are busy.”). 
 124 See Core, supra note 113, at 387–88 (concluding that busy directors are associated with 
significantly higher CEO compensation). But see John Byrd et al., Director Tenure and the Com-
pensation of Bank CEOs, 36 MANAGERIAL FIN. 86, 95 (2010) (finding that the average number of 
directorships held by outside directors is negatively correlated with CEO pay in a sample of pub-
licly traded depository institutions). 
 125 Flora Niu & Greg Berberich, Director Tenure and Busyness and Corporate Governance, 6 
INT’L J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 56, 62, 64–65 (2015). 
 126 Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 461 (1996). Some conflicting 
evidence suggests that busy directors are not associated with a higher risk of securities litigation. 
See Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1105–09 (finding a statistically insignificant relationship be-
tween the number of directorships per outside director and the likelihood of securities litigation); 
Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 
352, 354 (2009) (finding an association between the percentage of board members who serve on 
four or more boards and a lower risk of securities litigation). These studies, however, are com-
prised predominantly of smaller firms and thus are consistent with the view that busy boards are 
more harmful to larger firms. See Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1090–91 (sample comprised pri-
marily of non-S&P 500 and non-Forbes 500 firms); Talley, supra, at 345 (sample weighted toward 
S&P Smallcap and Midcap firms). 
 127 See Nandini Chandar et al., Does Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation 
Committees Improve a Firm’s Financial Reporting Quality?, 11 REV. ACCT. & FIN. 141, 153 
(2012) (finding that audit committee members with more work-intensive committee assignments 
are associated with weaker financial reporting quality). 
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Third, busy directors detract from firm performance because they are 
susceptible to attention shocks that distract them from company business. 
When a firm with which a director is associated experiences a major event—
for example, a merger or acquisition proposal, the departure of a key officer 
or director, or a sustained period of poor performance—the director’s time 
commitment to that firm increases.128 The director, in turn, neglects other 
board memberships, leading to poor performance by those firms.129 
In sum, the empirical evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion: di-
rectors with many professional commitments are detrimental for large, pub-
lic companies. Although busy directors may benefit smaller companies, 
they lack the time and attention to provide the monitoring and oversight that 
larger, more complex companies require. 
C. Evidence from Financial Firms 
Financial institutions are particularly aggressive in seeking out other 
companies’ directors or executives to serve on their boards. Commercial 
banks, for example, recruit directors affiliated with other companies to de-
velop lending relationships with those firms.130 Financial institutions, more-
over, prefer well-connected directors who can provide information about 
other sectors of the economy and broader economic trends.131 As a result, 
financial institution directors rank among the busiest corporate board mem-
bers.132 
The empirical evidence discussed above suggests that busy directors 
weaken corporate governance for large, complex financial institutions. It 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALI-
TY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 115–16 (1989) (describing directors’ elevated time com-
mitments during corporate crises). 
 129 See Falato et al., supra note 117 (finding a long-term reduction in market value when an 
S&P 1500 firm’s director sits on the board of another firm that experiences the sudden death of a 
co-director or CEO that necessitates the director’s increased attention on the affected firm); 
Ronald. W. Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, Preoccupied Independent Directors, 2, 21–25 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 522, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816470 [https://perma.cc/U558-YPKA] (finding that 22% of S&P 1500 
independent directors are preoccupied with major distractions every year and that firms with a “high-
er proportion of preoccupied independent directors . . . [have] lower firm value and worse [merger-
and-acquisition] performance”); Luke C.D. Stein & Hong Zhao, Distracted Directors: Evidence from 
Directors’ Outside Employment 12–14 (Aug. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946579 [https://perma.cc/GEW9-HT4Q] (finding that compa-
nies with directors whose employing firms experience periods of poor results suffer declines in 
performance and value). 
 130 See Gerald F. Davis & Mark S. Mizruchi, The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial 
Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 215, 219 (1999) (discuss-
ing reasons that financial institutions appoint well-connected directors). 
 131 See id. at 219, 225. 
 132 See infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text. 
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may not be appropriate, however, to draw conclusions from market-wide 
data about the effect of director busyness on financial firms.133 Indeed, as 
Part I explores, governance of financial firms differs from nonfinancial 
firms in meaningful ways.134 Directors’ outside professional commitments 
might therefore affect financial firms differently than nonfinancial firms. On 
one hand, directors’ outside commitments might uniquely benefit financial 
companies, as directors could connect financial firms to potential corporate 
borrowers or investment banking clients.135 On the other hand, however, too 
many outside commitments could be particularly detrimental for directors 
of financial firms in light of the intensive monitoring demanded by those 
companies.136 
Recent developments in financial firm governance suggest that busy 
directors may, in fact, be especially problematic for financial institutions. 
Although all directors’ corporate governance responsibilities became more 
involved after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financial firm direc-
tors experienced unique increases in their monitoring duties following the 
financial crisis.137 Financial institution directors receive more voluminous 
information—in the form of management reports and supervisory assess-
ments—than directors of nonfinancial firms.138 Directors of financial com-
panies, moreover, tend to serve on more board committees than directors of 
nonfinancial firms.139 Service on the board of a large, complex financial 
institution thus requires considerably more time and attention than a nonfi-
nancial company board.140 
Financial institutions, moreover, are unlikely to realize the benefits that 
directors with governance experience at other companies might provide. 
According to an empirical study, busy directors enhance a firm’s corporate 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See Elyas Elyasiani & Ling Zhang, Bank Holding Company Performance, Risk, and 
“Busy” Board of Directors, 60 J. BANKING & FIN. 239, 240 (2015) (“[T]he governance dynamics 
of BHCs and nonfinancial firms are dissimilar and, therefore, it is improper to draw conclusions 
about BHC boards from research on nonfinancial firm boards.”). 
 134 See supra notes 46–75 and accompanying text. 
 135 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 49 (noting that directors who are affiliated with both 
financial and nonfinancial firms frequently facilitate access to capital); Davis & Mizruchi, supra 
note 130, at 219 (1999) (same). 
 136 See supra notes 64–75 and accompanying text. 
 137 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.  
 138 See Partnoy, supra note 46, at 5 (asserting that risk management systems “should deliver 
much more information to the board of firms that have substantial exposure to financial risk than 
boards of firms that do not”). 
 139 See Jiraporn, supra note 120, at 825 (finding that directors of regulated firms, including 
finance and utility companies, serve on more committees than directors of firms in unregulated 
industries). 
 140 See Andy Peters, Are Some Bank Directors Spread Too Thin?, AM. BANKER, May 5, 
2016, at 1 (“Directors of banks and [BHCs] spend a lot more time with their companies than direc-
tors in other industries.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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governance effectiveness only when they serve on boards of companies in a 
similar industry.141 Busy directors, in other words, confer governance bene-
fits only if the other companies with which they are affiliated are in a relat-
ed business.142 The Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act (the 
“Interlocks Act”), however, prevents directors and executives of a large 
banking organization from serving on the board of another banking organi-
zation.143 Since their other professional commitments must be in unrelated 
industries, busy directors do not enhance the governance of financial firms. 
Consistent with this intuition, a handful of financial sector-specific 
studies have concluded that director busyness is detrimental for financial 
companies. Professors Renée Adams and Hamid Mehran, for instance, stud-
ied thirty-five of the largest BHCs from 1986 to 1999 and found “a negative 
and significant relationship between performance and . . . the average num-
ber of external directorships held by” a BHC’s independent directors.144 
They found, in particular, that BHC directors holding a greater number of 
board seats are associated with a lower Tobin’s Q, the ratio of a firm’s mar-
ket value relative to its total assets.145 
Other studies confirm that director busyness is associated with in-
creased risk in financial firms. Professors Elizabeth Cooper and Hatice Uz-
un, for example, analyzed 147 of the largest BHCs in 2006 and found that 
director busyness is correlated with higher levels of risk, as measured by 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Curtis Clements et al., Multiple Directorships, Industry Relatedness, and Corporate 
Governance Effectiveness, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 590, 597, 601–03 (2015) (finding a negative 
correlation between a firm’s reported material internal control weaknesses and the number of 
industry-related outside boards on which the firm’s directors serve, as measured by two-digit 
North American Industry Classification System code). When directors serve on the boards of 
companies in unrelated industries, however, they detract from the firm’s governance. See id.; see 
also Alexander Ljungqvist & Konrad Raff, Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring 
Synergies 36–37, (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 533, 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919926 [https://perma.cc/3BDY-QGCD] (finding 
positive effect on shareholder value when directors serve on boards in related industries). 
 142 See Clements et al., supra note 141. 
 143 Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act § 204, 12 U.S.C. § 3203 (2012) (pro-
hibiting the officers and directors of a depository institution holding company with more than $2.5 
billion in total assets from serving as an officer or director of a depository institution holding 
company with more than $1.5 billion in total assets). The Interlocks Act prohibitions are even 
more stringent than the Clayton Act’s general prohibition on serving on the boards of direct com-
petitors. See Renée Birgit Adams, Governance of Banking Institutions, in CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 451, 455 (H. Kent Baker & Ronald 
Anderson eds., 2010) (comparing the Interlocks Act and Clayton Act). 
 144 Renée B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for 
Large Bank Holding Companies, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 243, 259 (2012). 
 145 Id. at 257; see also Grove et al., supra note 122, at 431 (finding significant negative asso-
ciation between busy directors and return on assets in U.S. commercial banks between 2006–
2008). 
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stock market returns.146 They determined, in fact, that one additional direc-
torship per BHC director is associated with up to an 8.4% increase in 
risk.147 Cooper and Uzun conclude that “directors with less distraction in 
terms of other directorships . . . tend to monitor banks that ultimately have 
less risk than banks with busy directors.”148 
Director busyness appears to be associated with increased risks for 
nonbank financial companies, as well. Professors Maureen Muller-Kahle 
and Krista Lewellyn studied a sample of publicly-traded nonbank lenders 
from 1997–2005 and determined that outside directors holding a greater 
number of board seats were associated with higher concentrations in sub-
prime lending relative to safer, prime lending.149 Muller-Kahle and Lewel-
lyn posited that firms with busy boards were likely to be distracted by other 
professional commitments, leading to “ineffective group decision making” 
and increased concentrations in subprime loans.150 They concluded that 
“busy boards may not be the most effective boards when it comes to over-
seeing risky strategic initiatives.”151 
Although the foregoing evidence strongly suggests that director busy-
ness is problematic for financial firms, some caution is appropriate in light 
of a single study suggesting that director busyness is associated with better 
BHC performance and lower risk. In a study of 116 BHCs from 2001–2010, 
Professor Elyas Elyasiani and Ling Zhang found that firms with a greater 
number of busy directors had better performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q 
and return on assets.152 Elyasiani and Zhang also determined that busy 
boards were associated with higher asset quality and lower levels of total, 
market, and idiosyncratic risk, as measured by stock market returns.153 They 
argue that their results show that directors with multiple directorships are 
more capable of fulfilling BHCs’ monitoring and advising needs “due to the 
extensive knowledge, information, and experience they have accumulated 
by sitting on multiple boards.”154 
This study, however, suffers from a number of serious flaws. For one, 
Elyasiani and Zhang fail to acknowledge the studies discussed earlier that 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Elizabeth Cooper & Hatice Uzun, Directors with a Full Plate: The Impact of Busy Direc-
tors on Bank Risk, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 571, 580–83 (2012) (using directorships per independent 
director and the percentage of directors with three or more directorships as proxies for director 
busyness). 
 147 Id. at 583. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The 
Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE 405, 411 (2011). 
 150 Id. at 408. 
 151 Id. at 413. 
 152 Elyasiani & Zhang, supra note 133, at 244–45. 
 153 Id. at 245–46. 
 154 Id. at 248–49. 
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show director busyness has a detrimental effect on financial firms, and they 
thus do not attempt to distinguish contradictory evidence.155 Elyasiani and 
Zhang, moreover, exclude the largest BHCs from their sample.156 This 
omission calls into question whether their conclusions are applicable to the 
largest and most complex BHCs. Further, they limit their sample to BHCs, 
and their study thus fails to detect the effect of busy directors on nonbank 
financial companies. Finally, Elyasiani and Zhang acknowledge that the 
alleged association between director busyness and lower riskiness did not 
hold true during the financial crisis.157 The study, therefore, is far from con-
clusive. 
On balance, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that busy di-
rectors are associated with worse performance and higher risk in large fi-
nancial firms, just as they are in large nonfinancial companies. The studies 
by Adams and Mehran, Cooper and Uzun, and Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn 
are more strongly weighted to the largest financial firms and cover a broad-
er range of nonbank financial companies than the sole contradictory study 
by Elyasiani and Zhang. Therefore, the most plausible conclusion, based on 
the entirety of the empirical evidence, is that busy directors increase risk 
and decrease performance for large, complex financial firms. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
Although the empirical literature strongly suggests that director busy-
ness is detrimental for large financial companies, to date no one has explored 
how director busyness harms financial companies. The following case studies 
examine—for the first time—the ways in which directors’ outside commit-
ments affect the operation of corporate governance mechanisms in financial 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See id. at 239 (“To date, no study has looked at the association between busy boards and 
[BHC] behavior.”); see also id. at 241 (“To our knowledge, no similar studies [of director busy-
ness] have been conducted for BHCs.”). 
 156 See id. at 243 (noting that the largest BHC in the study had total assets of $707 billion). By 
2010 (the end of the study period), six BHCs—Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo—had assets in excess of $707 billion. See 
NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2011), https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/
BHCPRRPT/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/Dec2010/PeerGroup_1_december2010.pdf [https://perma.
cc/F3G2-5R9G]. Thus, it appears that Elyasiani and Zhang excluded these BHCs from their sam-
ple. The other studies discussed in this Section, by contrast, generally included the largest BHCs. 
See, e.g., E-mail from Elizabeth Webb Cooper, Assoc. Professor of Fin., La Salle Univ., to Jeremy 
C. Kress, Senior Research Fellow, Ctr. on Fin., Law, & Policy, Univ. Mich. (July 15, 2016) (on 
file with author) (confirming that Cooper’s and Uzun’s sample included Bank of America, 
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo). 
 157 Elyasiani and Zhang, supra note 133, at 246 (“[D]uring the crisis, the benefits of busy 
directors in reducing risk were smaller than they were in non-crisis times. It appears that the 
strong effect of the crisis overpowered the directors’ skills, curtailing their influence on risk 
. . . .”). 
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firms. The case studies focus, in particular, on how director busyness affects a 
board’s ability to implement and oversee monitoring systems to detect and 
deter misconduct and excessive risks. Taken together, the case studies demon-
strate that boards of large, complex financial firms are better able to mitigate 
risks when directors have fewer outside professional engagements. 
A. Wells Fargo’s Fraudulent Accounts Scandal 
In late 2016, Wells Fargo infamously lost $25 billion in market capital-
ization when it agreed to settle charges that its employees had opened as 
many as 3.5 million unauthorized customer accounts to meet aggressive 
cross-selling targets.158 Key members of Wells Fargo’s board of directors 
learned of potential sales practices violations as early as 2005,159 and Wells 
Fargo’s full board became aware of the misconduct no later than 2013, 
when the Los Angeles Times published an exposé on customer abuses in the 
bank’s west-coast branches.160 The sales practices violations, however, per-
sisted for three more years.161 The important governance question, then, is 
why Wells Fargo’s directors failed to stop the misconduct when they first 
learned of the violations. 
Although many factors undoubtedly contributed to a governance fail-
ure of this magnitude,162 the extent to which Wells Fargo’s directors were 
distracted from their responsibilities by outside professional engagements is 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Fined for Sales Scam, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2016, at A1; 
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Raises Its Tally of Fake Accounts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2017, at A1; 
see also Wells Fargo Hit with Class Action Lawsuit Over Sales Practices, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 
2016 10:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-lawsuit/wells-fargo-hit-
with-class-action-lawsuit-over-sales-practices-idUSKCN11X06F [https://perma.cc/9SVH-CA9K] 
(noting loss of market capitalization). 
 159 See OFFICE OF ENTER. GOVERNANCE AND THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROL-
LER OF THE CURRENCY, LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT 
WELLS FARGO 5 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/pub-wells-fargo-supervision-lessons-learned-41917.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL6C-ML7P] (noting 
that the bank’s board received regular reports of internal ethics complaints and employee termina-
tions related to sales practices violations). 
 160 E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-
pressure-20131222-story.html [https://perma.cc/7DW3-K42F]; see also INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. 
OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT 100 (2017) [hereinafter 
WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT], https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-
relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CEB-JU69] (acknowledging that 
the board was aware of the Los Angeles Times report). 
 161 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, 2016 WL 6646128 (Sept. 8, 
2016) (noting that illegal conduct continued until September 8, 2016). 
 162 See, e.g., Aaron Back, Wells Fargo Shows Case for a Divide, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2016, 
at C8 (asserting that Wells Fargo’s combined CEO-chairman position impaired oversight of man-
agement); see also WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 4–9 (identifying decentral-
ized organizational structure and deference to bank-level leadership as root causes of misconduct). 
2018] The Risks of Overcommitted Financial Institution Directors 905 
a key—and, until now, unexplored—cause of the scandal. A close evalua-
tion of Wells Fargo’s board reveals that overcommitment inhibited its abil-
ity to diagnose the firm’s sales practices problems and to implement and 
follow up on corrective measures. 
While Wells Fargo’s employees opened millions of fake customer ac-
counts in response to incentives established by the bank’s senior manage-
ment, its directors were extraordinarily busy with other professional obliga-
tions. Wells Fargo’s directors, in fact, were busier than the directors of any 
other U.S. banking organization.163 As depicted in Table 1, for instance, 
nine of Wells Fargo’s thirteen independent directors served on three or more 
public company boards in 2014, just after the bank’s sales practices became 
subject to public scrutiny. 
Table 1164 
 
Wells Fargo & Co. Independent Directors (2014) 
Director Board Role 
Executive 
Employment 
Other Public Company 
Board Seats 
John D. Baker II   
Patriot Transportation Hold-
ing, Inc.; Texas Industries, 
Inc. 
Elaine L. Chao   
News Corp.; Protective Life 
Corp. 
John S. Chen  
CEO, BlackBer-
ry Ltd. 
BlackBerry Ltd.; The Walt 
Disney Co. 
Lloyd H. Dean 
Chair, Human 
Resources Com-
mittee 
CEO, Dignity 
Health 
Cytori Therapeutics, Inc.; 
Premier, Inc. 
Susan E. Engel    
Enrique 
Hernandez 
Chair, Risk and 
Finance Commit-
tees 
CEO, Inter-Con 
Security Sys-
tems, Inc. 
Chevron Corp.; McDonald’s 
Corp.; Nordstrom, Inc. 
Donald M. 
James 
 
CEO, Vulcan 
Materials Co. 
Vulcan Materials Co.; 
Southern Co. 
Cynthia H. 
Milligan 
Chair, Credit 
Committee 
 
Calvert Funds; Kellogg Co.; 
Raven Industries, Inc. 
Federico F. 
Pena 
  Sonic Corp. 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Peters, supra note 140, at 1 (noting that Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and FCB Holdings 
had the three busiest bank boards nationwide). A higher proportion of Wells Fargo’s directors 
served on three or more boards when compared to Citigroup and FCB Holdings. See Citigroup, 
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 1–2 (Mar. 15, 2017) (8 of 16 directors); FCB Financial 
Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5–8 (Apr. 5, 2016) (6 of 11 directors); Wells 
Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 4–11 (Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Wells Fargo 
2016 Proxy Statement] (9 of 15 directors). 
 164 See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 2–9 (Mar. 18, 2014). This Table 
is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/
BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. 
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James H. 
Quigley 
Chair, Audit 
Committee 
 
Hess Corp.; Merrimack 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Judith M. 
Runstad 
Chair, Corporate 
Responsibility 
Committee 
  
Stephen W. 
Sanger 
Lead Independ-
ent Director 
 Pfizer, Inc. 
Susan G.  
Swenson 
  
Harmonic, Inc.; Novatel 
Wireless, Inc.; Spirent 
Communications plc 
 
Three key Wells Fargo directors bore particular responsibility for ad-
dressing the bank’s sales practices issues. As the firm’s lead independent 
director, Stephen Sanger scheduled the board’s meetings, approved the 
board’s agenda, and coordinated coverage of governance issues among the 
board’s committees.165 James Quigley chaired the audit committee, which 
oversaw legal and regulatory compliance.166 Enrique Hernandez chaired the 
risk committee, which oversaw the firm’s enterprise-wide risk management 
framework and became primarily responsible for addressing the sales prac-
tices problems.167 
Each of these key directors was stretched thin with outside profession-
al commitments during the period of Wells Fargo’s misconduct. Sanger and 
Quigley both served on the boards of two other multinational, public com-
panies in addition to Wells Fargo.168 Hernandez’s commitments were even 
more extensive. Hernandez served on the boards of three other public com-
panies: Chevron Corporation, McDonald’s Corporation, and Nordstrom, 
Inc., of which he was the chairman of the board.169 Hernandez’s four public 
company boards placed him in the top 5% of the most “overboarded” cor-
porate directors in America.170 Furthermore, Hernandez was the CEO of 
Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc., one of the largest private security services 
companies in the United States.171 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Wells Fargo 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 163, at 19, 78. 
 166 Id. at 9. 
 167 Id. at 12; see also WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 100–08 (describing 
the risk committee’s engagement on sales practices issues). 
 168 See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7–8 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement]. In addition to Pfizer, Inc., Sanger served on the board of 
Target Corporation until his retirement in March 2013. See Target Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 
DEF 14A) 24 (May 19, 2014). 
 169 See Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement, supra note 168, at 5. 
 170 See Lublin, supra note 79 (noting that 5% of S&P 500 directors served on four or more 
public company boards in 2015). 
 171 See Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement, supra note 168, at 5; see also History, INTER-CON 
SECURITY, http://www.icsecurity.com/profile/history [https://perma.cc/55H7-DFQE] (describing 
Inter-Con’s “tens of thousands of security and event personnel operating on four continents”). 
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Wells Fargo’s busy directors missed crucial opportunities to eliminate 
customer abuses at the bank. Following the settlements, an ad hoc commit-
tee of Wells Fargo’s independent directors commissioned a report on the 
root causes of the sales practices violations.172 The report identifies several 
key areas in which the Wells Fargo board fell short. The report, for instance, 
acknowledges that senior risk managers highlighted sales practices as one 
of the top ten risks facing the firm in meetings with the risk committee and 
board.173 Despite these warnings, the board failed to act. The risk committee 
and board did not insist that management prepare detailed and concrete 
plans to address the sales practices abuses.174 Nor did the directors press 
forcefully to change leadership in the parts of the bank where the abuses 
originated.175 It was not until after the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a 
lawsuit against Wells Fargo that the board of directors began to follow up 
on these issues more diligently.176 
Wells Fargo’s board missed opportunities to address the bank’s sales 
practices issues, at least in part, because its busy directors were missing in 
action. As discussed above, boards comprised of busy directors meet less 
frequently, and fewer meetings are associated with worse financial out-
comes.177 Wells Fargo’s directors were so busy that they rarely met as a full 
board or in their committees. Indeed, as depicted in Table 2, Wells Fargo’s 
full board and risk and audit committees met significantly less frequently 
than those of peer U.S. banking organizations during the period of the mis-
conduct.178 Every year between 2012 and 2015, for example, Wells Fargo 
held fewer board and risk committee meetings than any of its peer banks.179 
                                                                                                                           
 172 WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT, supra note 160; see also Letter from Sen. Elizabeth War-
ren to Hon. Janet Yellen, Chair, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors (June 19, 2017), https://www.
warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017-6-19_Warren_Ltr_to_Fed.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E8V-
52YH] (discussing Wells Fargo’s “inadequate” risk management practices and arguing that the 
directors’ inaction demonstrated “continuing disregard” for the bank’s safety and soundness). 
 173 See WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 100–01. 
 174 See id. at 17. 
 175 See id. 
 176 See id. at 103–10. 
 177 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 178 This Article considers Wells Fargo’s peer banking organizations to be the seven other U.S. 
companies, in addition to Wells Fargo, that the Financial Stability Board deems “global systemi-
cally important banks” (“G-SIB”). G-SIBs are banking organizations whose failure would cause 
significant disruption to the financial system and broader economy, based on their size, intercon-
nectedness, substitutability, cross-jurisdictional activity, and complexity. See BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT 
BANKS: UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER LOSS ABSORBENCY RE-
QUIREMENT 5 (2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ4U-BEK2]. The 
eight U.S. G-SIBs are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2016 
LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS) 3 (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
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Table 2180 
 
Number of Board and Committee Meetings 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Full Board      
Wells Fargo 13 9 9 9 9 
Peer Banks (average) 14.9 14.1 13.7 16.6 15.3 
      
Risk Committee      
Wells Fargo 4 4 6 6 7 
Peer Banks (average) 8.3 8.3 8.4 10.3 9.6 
      
Audit Committee      
Wells Fargo 9 9 9 10 14 
Peer Banks (average) 14.1 14.1 14.9 15.6 15.6 
 
In sum, from at least 2005 until 2016, Wells Fargo’s directors failed to 
respond to red flags regarding sales practices violations, and they permitted 
the bank to operate with substandard risk management infrastructure. They 
did this, in part, because they were more overcommitted than the directors 
of any other bank. The three independent directors most responsible for ad-
dressing Wells Fargo’s sales practices issues—Sanger, Quigley, and Her-
nandez—were especially busy, leading to insufficient time and attention 
spent on risk oversight. Wells Fargo’s fake account scandal, therefore, is a 
cautionary tale as to how director busyness inhibits oversight of traditional 
banking risks. 
B. JPMorgan and the London Whale 
Director busyness also detracts from oversight of trading risks, as was 
the case in JPMorgan’s London Whale trading losses. The London Whale 
was the nickname eventually given to Bruno Iksil, a trader in JPMorgan’s 
                                                                                                                           
content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
92LV-F3ZX]. 
 179 Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 1 (Mar. 26, 2015); Bank of New 
York Mellon Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 19–22 (Mar. 13, 2015); Citigroup, Inc., 
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 16 ( Mar. 18, 2015); Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy State-
ment (Form DEF 14A) 34 (Apr. 10, 2015); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A) 22 (Apr. 8, 2015); Morgan Stanley, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 15–16 (Apr. 1, 2015); 
State Street Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 23–24 (Apr. 6, 2015); Wells Fargo & Co., 
Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 15–17 (Mar. 17, 2015). 
 180 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for 
Table 2 were hand-collected from the 2011–2015 proxy statements of the eight U.S. G-SIBs, as 
filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database. See supra note 178 for a list of Wells Fargo’s peer banking 
organizations. 
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Chief Investment Office (“CIO”). In late 2011, Iksil began amassing credit 
derivatives, allegedly to hedge JPMorgan’s exposure to credit markets.181 
Iksil’s trading positions, however, were imperfectly calibrated to JPMor-
gan’s actual exposures, and the derivatives portfolio lost value.182 Desperate 
to offset his initial losses, Iksil doubled down on his strategy, purchasing 
even more derivatives and breaching JPMorgan’s risk limits more than three 
hundred times in the process.183 Iksil’s positions dominated the market by 
early February 2012.184 Rival traders ganged up on Iksil, driving down the 
value of his massive derivatives portfolio.185 By the time the dust settled, 
JPMorgan lost more than $6 billion on Iksil’s ill-conceived trades and in-
curred more than $1 billion in fines for inadequate risk monitoring.186 
The seeds of the London Whale trading loss were sown in 2005, when 
JPMorgan created the CIO as a separate division within its bank. JPMorgan 
charged the CIO with managing the firm’s excess deposits, a portfolio that 
quickly grew to more than $350 billion.187 The CIO typically invested these 
funds in safe, low-yielding assets like Treasury securities, but leaders within 
the bank soon came to view the CIO as a potential profit center.188 Shortly 
after its establishment, the CIO received approval to begin trading synthetic 
credit derivatives.189 Iksil and other CIO traders used this authority to gen-
erate windfall profits in 2011, leading to expectations among JPMorgan’s 
senior leaders that CIO would repeat its performance.190 
JPMorgan maintained a Risk Policy Committee (“RPC”) on its board 
of directors that was responsible for overseeing senior management’s efforts 
to address significant risks facing the firm.191 The RPC, among other func-
tions, reviewed policies for assessing and managing risks, assisted man-
agement in establishing risk limits, and oversaw reports of JPMorgan’s ma-
jor risk exposures and management’s efforts to control significant risks.192 
                                                                                                                           
 181 SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 50–53. 
 182 Id. at 76–77. 
 183 Id. at 75–85, 153. 
 184 Id. at 81. 
 185 Id. at 88–90. 
 186 Id. at 94; see also Douglas, supra note 11 (discussing fines). 
 187 SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 21–22. If the CIO had been a stand-alone 
bank, it would have been the seventh largest bank in the United States. See id. at 22. 
 188 Id. at 55, 63. 
 189 Id. at 37. 
 190 Id. at 53–55, 63. 
 191 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter 
JPMorgan 2007 Proxy Statement] (providing that the RPC is “responsible for oversight of the 
CEO’s and senior management’s responsibilities to assess and manage the Firm’s credit risk, mar-
ket risk, interest rate risk, investment risk, liquidity risk and reputational risk . . . .”). 
 192 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., RISK POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER, https://web.archive.org/
web/20100125110431/http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/about-jpmc/risk-committee-charter.
htm (reflecting version of RPC charter in effect as of January 25, 2010). 
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JPMorgan’s firm-wide chief risk officer and other senior risk managers reg-
ularly reported to the RPC.193 
James Crown became the chair of the RPC around the time that 
JPMorgan established the CIO as a separate division.194 As chairman of the 
RPC, Crown was responsible for setting the committee’s agenda.195 Crown, 
a former investment banker at Salomon Brothers, Inc., had served on the 
board of JPMorgan or its predecessor for more than a decade.196 The grand-
son of a wealthy industrialist, Crown left investment banking in the mid-
1980s to join his family’s multi-billion dollar investment company, Henry 
Crown & Co., where he took over as president in 2003.197 In addition to 
running Henry Crown & Co. and chairing JPMorgan’s RPC, Crown also 
served as the lead independent director of both Sara Lee and General Dy-
namics.198 With his leadership role in the family business and with key gov-
ernance positions on the boards of three large, public companies, Crown 
ranked among the busiest corporate directors in the United States.199 On top 
of those commitments, Crown also chaired the University of Chicago Med-
ical Center Board of Trustees and served as a trustee of the Museum of Sci-
ence and Industry, The Aspen Institute, the University of Chicago, and the 
Chicago Symphony Orchestra.200 
While Crown juggled his professional responsibilities, the RPC failed 
to ensure that the new CIO division established an effective risk manage-
ment infrastructure. The RPC, for example, did not address the fact that, 
unlike all of JPMorgan’s other business lines, the CIO lacked a line-of-
business chief risk officer (“CRO”).201 The RPC, moreover, permitted the 
CIO’s senior-most risk officer to report directly to the head of the CIO, ra-
ther than to the firm-wide chief risk officer.202 This reporting structure cre-
ated conflicts of interest, with CIO risk managers more beholden to CIO 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See, e.g., SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 157. 
 194 JPMorgan 2007 Proxy Statement, supra note 191, at 6. 
 195 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter 
JPMorgan 2010 Proxy Statement]. 
 196 Id. at 3. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7 (Mar. 18, 2011); Sara 
Lee Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Sept. 14, 2007). Prior to becoming the lead inde-
pendent director of General Dynamics in May 2010, Crown served as chair of the nominating and 
corporate governance committee. See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 
13 (Mar 23, 2007). 
 199 In 2012, for example, one-third of S&P 500 directors served on three or more public com-
pany boards. See SPENCER STUART 2012 BOARD INDEX, supra note 95, at 16. 
 200 See JPMorgan 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 195, at 3. 
 201 See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 155. When the CIO finally hired a busi-
ness-line CRO in early 2012, it hired the brother-in-law of JPMorgan’s firm-wide CRO. See id. at 
162. 
 202 See id. at 160. 
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management than to the firm-wide risk organization.203 The RPC also failed 
to ensure that the firm paid its risk managers competitive salaries.204 In sum, 
in the early years of Crown’s tenure as chair of the RPC, the RPC continual-
ly failed to identify or address shortcomings in the CIO’s risk management. 
Troublingly, Crown’s outside professional commitments became par-
ticularly time-consuming in 2011, just as Iksil began building his credit de-
rivative portfolio.205 Crown had just been promoted to chairman of Sara 
Lee’s board after the prior chairman and CEO suffered a stroke and re-
signed.206 In January 2011, Sara Lee announced its intention to undergo a 
large-scale reorganization, spinning off its international beverage and bak-
ery business into a separate public company.207 Throughout 2011, therefore, 
while Iksil dramatically increased the risk profile of the CIO, Crown faced 
the extraordinary tasks of overseeing Sara Lee’s CEO search and spin-off. 
After a contentious and protracted search,208 Sara Lee ultimately hired a 
new CEO in early 2012.209 Sara Lee completed its spin-off in June 2012, 
just one month after JPMorgan disclosed the London Whale losses.210 
Crown experienced additional attention shocks around the time that 
Iksil began amassing credit derivatives. General Dynamics, a defense con-
tractor primarily reliant on government contracts, was coping with the ef-
fects of sequestration—congressionally mandated reductions in the defense 
budget of up to $1 trillion that were enacted in August 2011.211 Crown, re-
cently elevated to become General Dynamic’s first lead director, became 
primarily responsible for exercising independent oversight of the firm while 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See id. In response to regulatory pressure, JPMorgan eventually changed the reporting 
lines so that the senior risk manager reported directly to the firm-wide CRO and indirectly to the 
head of CIO. The senior risk manager, however, later testified that the functional reorganization 
did not, in practice, diminish his loyalty to CIO’s management. See id. 
 204 See Nelson D. Schwartz & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Was Warned About Lax Risk 
Controls, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/business/jpmorgan-
ignored-warning-on-risk-control.html [https://perma.cc/D667-KQ2M] (noting that “JPMorgan ex-
ecutives charged with judging risk were paid significantly less than their counterparts at other 
banks”). 
 205 See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 51 (noting that CIO’s credit derivative 
portfolio grew by more than tenfold to $51 billion during 2011). 
 206 See Sara Lee Chief Is Leaving After a Stroke, supra note 2. 
 207 See Korn & Brat, supra note 2. 
 208 See Joann S. Lublin & Julie Jargon, Sara Lee Changes Horses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 
2011, at B2 (noting that Sara Lee’s board suddenly “reversed course” and decided not to promote 
an internal candidate to CEO). 
 209 See York, supra note 2. 
 210 See Press Release, Hillshire Brands Co., supra note 10; see also Fitzpatrick et al., supra 
note 11. 
 211 See General Dynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10, 19 (Feb. 17, 2012); see also 
Censer, supra note 3. 
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it reformulated its corporate strategy.212 In the meantime, Crown continued 
to oversee Henry Crown & Co.’s sprawling network of operating companies 
and exercised authority to sign off on all of the firm’s investment deci-
sions.213 
These attention shocks drew Crown’s focus away from JPMorgan’s 
risk governance at an especially inopportune time. Shareholders warned 
Crown about risk management deficiencies at JPMorgan in early 2011, just 
before Iksil began trading credit derivatives; yet the RPC failed to act.214 
Among other shortcomings, the CIO’s line-of-business risk committee—
comprised of the CIO’s top managers and risk officers—met only three 
times in 2011 and, unlike other line-of-business risk committees at JPMor-
gan, did not include personnel from other divisions to provide independent 
evaluation of the CIO’s trading strategies.215 The RPC, in the meantime, 
received periodic reports on CIO’s risk profile, and management alerted the 
RPC when the CIO breached company-wide risk limits.216 With Crown’s 
attention diverted elsewhere, however, the RPC failed to correct CIO’s risk 
management deficiencies in time to prevent Iksil’s trading losses.217 
There is, of course, no guarantee that JPMorgan would have prevented 
the London Whale trading losses had Crown been less overcommitted. In-
deed, other shortcomings undoubtedly contributed to such a significant 
breakdown in risk governance. JPMorgan’s management, for instance, 
could have been more forthcoming about risks in the CIO, which might 
have focused the board’s attention in time to prevent or mitigate the loss-
                                                                                                                           
 212 See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 14 (Mar. 16, 2012) (de-
scribing lead director’s authority and responsibilities). 
 213 See Harris, supra note 4. 
 214 See Schwartz & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 204 (noting that shareholder advocates 
warned Crown about risk management deficiencies during an April 2011 meeting). 
 215 SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 162–63; see also JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 
REPORT OF JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE REGARDING 2012 CIO LOSSES 
100 (2013) [hereinafter JPMORGAN TASK FORCE REPORT], http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
ONE/2272984969x0x628656/4cb574a0-0bf5-4728-9582-625e4519b5ab/Task_Force_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JUF7-6R75] (“There was no official membership or charter for the CIO Risk 
Committee and attendees typically included only personnel from CIO . . . . Had there been senior 
traders or risk managers from outside CIO or had the CIO Risk Committee met more often, the 
process might have been used to more pointedly vet the traders’ strategies in the first quarter of 
2012.”). 
 216 See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. 877, 880 (2013) (CIO risk summary report); id. at 1728, 1730 (noting 
that JPMorgan’s CRO alerted the RPC that CIO increased a key risk limit). Management did not, 
however, specifically inform the RPC of the burgeoning risks in Iksil’s credit derivatives portfolio 
until after the media publicly reported on the trades in April 2012. See SENATE JPMORGAN RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 162. 
 217 Iksil maintains that JPMorgan’s senior management assented to his trades. See Rebecca 
Davis O’Brien, ‘London Whale’ Civil Case Dropped, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2017, at B9. 
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es.218 JPMorgan’s board, moreover, could have appointed directors with 
more risk management expertise to serve alongside Crown on the RPC.219 
Crown’s overcommitment, however, inhibited effective risk govern-
ance at JPMorgan. Crown’s early tenure as chair of the RPC overlapped 
with his elevation to president of his family’s investment company and his 
assumption of leadership roles on the boards of Sara Lee and General Dy-
namics. With so many competing commitments, Crown failed to ensure that 
the nascent CIO established an appropriate risk management infrastructure. 
As the empirical evidence predicts, moreover, Crown’s outside commit-
ments created attention shocks—and they did so at a particularly inoppor-
tune time.220 Just as Iksil began building his massive credit derivatives port-
folio, Crown was distracted by Sara Lee’s CEO search and spin-off as well 
as General Dynamic’s sequestration challenge. Had Crown been less over-
committed, the RPC would have been more likely to address shareholders’ 
concerns about risk management deficiencies and would have been better 
able to detect the emerging risks in CIO. Crown’s busyness, therefore, was a 
key contributing factor to the London Whale losses. 
* * * * 
All of this is not to say, of course, that Wells Fargo would have averted 
its fake account scandal and JPMorgan would have avoided the London 
Whale losses had their respective boards been less overcommitted. Indeed, 
a banking organization’s officers and employees bear front-line responsibil-
ity for ferreting out misconduct and minimizing excessive risks.221 Rather, 
this Part’s primary contention is that Wells Fargo and JPMorgan would have 
been more likely to detect and deter the nascent problems if the boards—
and especially their key directors—had been less overcommitted. 
C. PNC and the Financial Crisis 
Although busy directors impair governance, the inverse is also true: di-
rectors with few outside commitments are better able to mitigate risks. A 
case study of PNC during the financial crisis demonstrates how directors 
with few outside commitments enhance governance of large financial com-
panies. PNC, the eighth largest banking organization in the United States, 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See JPMORGAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 215, at 42–43 (noting that CIO man-
agement did not disclose increasing risks in March 20, 2012, meeting with the RPC). 
 219 See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A Call for New Blood on the JPMorgan 
Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2013, 7:27 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/a-call-for-
new-blood-on-the-jpmorgan-board/ [https://perma.cc/9HUG-A8CA] (noting that the two members 
of the RPC other than Crown had never before worked in finance). 
 220 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
 221 See RISK MANAGEMENT RATING PROCESSES, supra note 68 (discussing senior manage-
ment’s responsibility for risk management). 
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was one of the strongest and most resilient banks during the market crash, 
with one analyst calling PNC the “biggest winner of the financial crisis.”222 
PNC achieved this success under the leadership of directors who were 
unusually focused on their governance responsibilities, with few competing 
professional commitments. In the lead-up to the crisis, twelve of PNC’s 
seventeen independent directors served only on PNC’s board or on the 
board of just one other company.223 No independent director with a full-
time executive position held more than three board seats.224 Crucially, two 
of PNC’s key directors—the chairmen of its risk and audit committees—
were both retired and served on no other public company boards.225 PNC’s 
board, in sum, was among the least busy of all U.S. banking organization 
boards.226 
PNC’s board of directors made several critical strategic decisions in 
the lead-up to and during the financial crisis that positioned the firm for 
success. PNC, for example, decided in 2000 to divest its mortgage origina-
tion and servicing business lines.227 PNC’s chairman presciently explained 
that PNC sold its mortgage business because PNC was not being adequately 
compensated to assume the risk that borrowers would default.228 
By limiting its residential mortgage exposure, PNC positioned itself 
for a series of strategic acquisitions during the crisis.229 Most notably, PNC 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Roben Farzad, A Bank CEO Thrives Far from Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 
2012, 3:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-26/a-bank-ceo-thrives-far-
from-wall-street [https://perma.cc/L7JL-B5MP] (quoting equity research analyst Dave Bugajski). 
 223 See PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6–7, 15 (Mar. 23, 2007) 
(noting that twelve of PNC’s seventeen independent directors held, at most, one other public com-
pany directorship). 
 224 Id. 
 225 See id. at 6–7, 25 (noting that neither audit committee chair Paul Chellgren nor risk com-
mittee chair Stephen Thieke held a full-time executive position or served on another public com-
pany board). 
 226 PNC’s independent directors served, on average, on 2.06 public company boards in 2007. 
See id. at 6–7, 15. The mean U.S. BHC board in 2007, by contrast, was comprised of outside di-
rectors with an average of 2.5 board appointments. See Marco Becht et al., supra note 48, at 448 
(sample of 500 U.S. banking organizations). 
 227 See Nikhil Deogun, Washington Mutual Agrees to Acquire Residential-Mortgage Business 
of PNC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at B2. Washington Mutual, which bought PNC’s mortgage 
divisions, infamously failed in 2008 due to its aggressive expansion in residential mortgage lend-
ing. See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. 
Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. 
 228 See Rob Garver, Jim Rohr Makes Right Choices in Trying Times for PNC, Industry, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 30, 2007, at 2 (quoting PNC chairman and CEO Jim Rohr explaining that PNC 
divested its mortgage business because “[w]e didn’t think we were getting paid for [taking credit 
risk]”). 
 229 See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman & Clint Riley, PNC Nears $6 Billion Mercantile Deal, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at A3 (acquisition of Mercantile Bankshares Corporation); Jennifer Gordon, 
PNC Gives Details on Sterling Buy, AM. BANKER, Feb. 7, 2008, at 20 (acquisition of Sterling 
Financial Corporation); Tim Mazzucca, Embattled Yardville Finds Buyer: Below-Market Deal 
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purchased troubled National City Corporation (“National City”) at the peak 
of the crisis, nearly doubling in size and expanding its geographic foot-
print.230 All the while, PNC’s board maintained a robust risk management 
framework, and PNC avoided major lawsuits and enforcement actions, in 
contrast to most banks its size.231 
PNC’s improved competitive position since the financial crisis is at-
tributable, at least in part, to its uncharacteristically focused and committed 
board of directors. PNC’s directors, with few outside engagements, met 
more frequently than Wells Fargo’s overcommitted directors, despite PNC 
being roughly one-fifth the size of Wells Fargo.232 The chairmen of PNC’s 
risk and audit committees were unaffiliated with other large, public compa-
nies and therefore were not susceptible to attention shocks like those expe-
rienced by JPMorgan’s Crown.233 
Most importantly, however, PNC directors had sufficient time and at-
tention to monitor PNC’s management. Indeed, PNC’s CEO attested to the 
degree to which PNC’s board challenged management. As the CEO later 
recounted in a media interview, when PNC was close to buying National 
City, the chairman of PNC’s risk committee confronted the CEO, saying, 
“[W]e’re in the middle of the worst recession since the Great Depression. 
We’ve had a housing collapse, a political uprising with a lot of regulatory 
change. And you’re proposing to buy a troubled bank larger than we 
are?”234 In sharp contrast to Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, PNC’s directors 
had the bandwidth to ask these difficult questions because they were not 
stretched thin by outside commitments. 
IV. FINANCIAL COMPANY BOARDS ARE ALARMINGLY OVERCOMMITTED 
Encouragingly, the empirical evidence on director busyness has con-
vinced some corporate boards to reign in their outside commitments. Some 
firms, for example, have declined to appoint director candidates with many 
                                                                                                                           
Would Boost PNC in Wealthy N.J. Areas, AM. BANKER, June 8, 2007, at 1 (acquisition of Yard-
ville National Bancorp); Mitchell Pacelle, PNC to Buy Riggs for $645 Million in New Agreement, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2005, at C5 (acquisition of Riggs National Corporation). 
 230 See PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.2, at 9 (Oct. 24, 2008); Dan 
Fitzpatrick et al., PNC Buys National City in Bank Shakeout, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at B1. 
 231 See Garver, supra note 228, at 2A (describing risk management at PNC). 
 232 In 2013, for example, PNC’s board, risk committee, and audit committee met 12, 9, and 12 
times, respectively. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 28 (Mar. 13, 2014). 
Wells Fargo’s board, risk committee, and audit committee, by contrast, met 9, 6, and 9 times, 
respectively. See Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement, supra note 168, at 9–12. 
 233 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 234 John Engen, Reflections of a Steel City Banker, BANK DIRECTOR (Aug. 5, 2013), http://
www.bankdirector.com/magazine/archives/3rd-quarter-2013/reflections-of-a-steel-city-banker/ 
[https://perma.cc/G85B-GJGX] (quoting PNC CEO Jim Rohr). 
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professional engagements, and certain directors have voluntarily limited 
their outside commitments as board workloads have increased.235 More than 
half of S&P 500 companies, moreover, have adopted caps on the number of 
outside boards on which their directors may serve.236 These limits tend to be 
relatively high, and firms routinely grant waivers from their restrictions.237 
Nonetheless, extreme overboarding—in which a director holds eight or 
more board seats—has all but disappeared.238 As a result of these changes, 
directors of large, public companies generally have fewer outside profes-
sional commitments today than they had decades ago.239 
Despite this progress, however, many financial institution boards re-
main severely overcommitted. This Part analyzes director busyness at the 
United States’ largest and most complex financial institutions. Included in 
the analysis are the eight U.S. banking organizations that the Financial Sta-
bility Board deems to be Global Systemically Important Banks (“G-SIBs”): 
Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo.240 Also 
included is Prudential Financial, Inc., a nonbank insurance company that 
could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability, according to the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council.241 The Article refers to such companies as “sys-
temically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”). 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See Chu & Davis, supra note 13, at 726–35 (providing evidence of firms’ declining pref-
erence for busy directors); see also Lublin, supra note 79 (providing examples of firms that refuse 
to appoint busy directors and directors who choose to limit their board service). 
 236 SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 17 (noting that 61% of S&P 500 
boards establish a numerical limit for directors’ outside board seats). 
 237 See id. (reporting that, of the companies that establish numerical limits on board service, 
19% cap total directorships at six or seven, 40% at five, 36% at four, and 5% at three); see also 
Lublin, supra note 79 (discussing waivers). 
 238 See David Yermack, Board Members and Company Value, 20 FIN. MKTS. & PORTFOLIO 
MGMT. 33, 39 (2006) (“[I]n 1995, more than 120 persons held eight or more board seats simulta-
neously in major American companies, and that number has dropped to only two persons five 
years later.”); see also Lublin, supra note 79 (reporting that five directors occupied six or more 
board seats in 2015, down from 308 in 2005). 
 239 See, e.g., Chu & Davis, supra note 13, at 726 (showing a decline in number of board seats 
among S&P 1500 directors between 2000–2010). 
 240 For an explanation of the G-SIB designation, see supra note 178. 
 241 See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABIL-
ITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 
(2013) (analyzing “material financial distress at Prudential Financial,” and concluding that it 
“could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability”) (on file with U.S. Treasury Department). This 
analysis excludes American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) and MetLife, Inc., each of which 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) initially designated as a nonbank financial 
company that could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability but has since had its designation re-
scinded or overturned. See infra notes 245–246. The analysis also excludes General Electric Capi-
tal Corporation, Inc., which had its FSOC designation rescinded and, in any event, is not a public-
ly traded company. 
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SIFI directors continue to be extraordinarily busy. As demonstrated in 
Table 3, when compared to the directors of all S&P 500 firms, directors of 
SIFIs are less likely to sit on only one public company board. SIFI direc-
tors, moreover, are much more likely than their S&P 500 counterparts to sit 
on three or more public company boards. 
Table 3242 
 
Independent Directors’ Corporate Board Affiliations (as of 2016) 
 SIFIs S&P 500 
1 Board 28% 36% 
3+ Boards 40% 33% 
 
This discrepancy is worrisome for several reasons. As discussed above, 
directors of financial institutions have historically held more outside profes-
sional engagements than directors of non-financial firms, at least in part 
because financial institutions want professional connections to other com-
panies who might become commercial or investment banking clients.243 But 
it is not clear that SIFIs actually benefit from directors who hold multiple 
professional commitments. Indeed, one would expect that institutions as 
established as Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, for instance, would not need di-
rectors to introduce them to other large, multinational companies.244 Not 
only are SIFIs unlikely to benefit from busy directors but they are most 
likely to suffer negative consequences when directors become distracted. 
Because large financial firms are more opaque, leveraged, and systemically 
risky than non-financial firms, good governance should require that SIFI 
directors have fewer outside professional commitments. 
The boards of a few SIFIs are especially overcommitted. As demon-
strated in Table 4, Citigroup is an outlier, with nearly two-thirds of its inde-
pendent directors serving on three or more public company boards.245 Five 
                                                                                                                           
 242 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. SIFI data 
were hand-collected from the proxy statements of the relevant companies, as filed on the SEC’s 
EDGAR database. For S&P 500 data, see SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 
18. 
 243 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
 244 See Field, supra note 108, at 73 (“Firms such as those in the Forbes 500 are likely to have 
large networks of connections, suggesting that the connectedness of busy directors would be less 
advantageous to them.”). 
 245 MetLife Inc., which the FSOC designated as systemically important in 2014, has a board 
that is even busier than Citigroup’s. Of MetLife’s independent directors, 80% serve on at least 
three public company boards. See MetLife, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 9–10, 12–22 
(Apr. 27, 2017). A federal district court, however, overturned FSOC’s designation of MetLife. See 
MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (2016). FSOC dropped its 
appeal of the district court’s order in January 2018. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight 
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additional SIFIs have boards on which at least 40% of independent directors 
meet the same threshold.246 Disturbingly, the SIFIs with the busiest boards 
are also those recognized as being the most systemically important. Indeed, 
the Financial Stability Board ranks Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman 
Sachs, and Wells Fargo as four of the five most systemically important U.S. 
banking organizations; yet, nearly half of their independent directors serve 
on at least three public company boards.247 As the firms most likely to in-
flict damage on the broader economy, these firms require the closest moni-
toring. They are unlikely to receive such monitoring, however, because their 
directors are particularly overcommitted. 
Table 4248 
 
Proportion of Independent Directors Serving on 3+ Public Company 
Boards (as of 2017)* 
Citigroup 61.5% 
Bank of America 46.2% 
Morgan Stanley 45.4% 
Goldman Sachs 44.4% 
Wells Fargo 42.8% 
Prudential 40.0% 
Bank of New York Mellon 33.3% 
JPMorgan 27.3% 
State Street 22.2% 
 
Most troublingly, busy directors are serving in key leadership roles at 
many SIFIs. For most SIFIs, in fact, the directors with the most important 
monitoring roles—the lead independent director, the audit committee chair, 
and the risk committee chair—have the most outside commitments. As 
demonstrated in Table 5, more than half of all SIFI audit and risk committee 
chairs serve on three or more boards. By contrast, only two SIFIs—Bank of 
                                                                                                                           
Council, No. 16-5086 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2018), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 1624 (per curiam order 
dismissing appeal).  
 246 AIG, which the FSOC designated as systemically important in 2013, also has a board on 
which more than 40% of independent directors serve on at least three public company boards. See 
American International Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 2 (Apr. 19, 2017) (41.7% 
of independent directors). The FSOC rescinded AIG’s designation in September 2017. FIN. STA-
BILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN 
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (AIG) (2017) (on file with U.S. Treasury Department). 
 247 See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 178, at 3. 
 248 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for 
Table 4 were hand-collected from the SIFIs’ 2017 proxy statements, as filed on the SEC’s ED-
GAR database. 
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America and Prudential—appoint directors with fewer than three board 
seats to all three key leadership positions. 
Table 5249 
 
Key SIFI Directors Serving on 3+ Public Company Boards  
(as of 2017)* 
 Lead Independ-
ent Director 
Risk Committee 
Chair 
Audit Commit-
tee Chair 
Bank of America    
Bank of New York 
Mellon 
   
Citigroup    
Goldman Sachs    
JPMorgan    
Morgan Stanley    
Prudential    
State Street    
Wells Fargo    
TOTAL 3 5 5 
 
This level of overcommitment among SIFI directors is cause for alarm. 
SIFIs—the same institutions that, if mismanaged, could inflict material dis-
tress on the broader economy—are being governed by extraordinarily busy 
directors. These directors are less inclined to participate in corporate deci-
sion making, less likely to monitor management, and more susceptible to 
attention shocks. Directors with key leadership positions are especially busy 
and, as the Wells Fargo and JPMorgan cases demonstrate, particularly vul-
nerable to distractedness. In sum, as a result of their many outside profes-
sional commitments, the directors of the United States’ most systemically 
important financial institutions are ill-equipped to detect and deter miscon-
duct and excessive risk-taking. 
V. ALLEVIATING DIRECTOR OVERCOMMITMENT 
What, then, should be done to alleviate director overcommitment in 
large, complex financial institutions? One might believe that private order-
                                                                                                                           
 249 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/
pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for 
Table 5 were hand-collected from the SIFIs’ 2017 proxy statements, as filed on the SEC’s ED-
GAR database. After its annual shareholders meeting, Wells Fargo announced that Karen Peetz 
would replace Enrique Hernandez as risk committee chair, effective on September 1, 2017. See 
Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Picks Duke to Be Chairman, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 2017, at B1. Peetz 
serves on no other public company boards. See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A) 21 (Mar. 15, 2017). 
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ing, or self-regulation by private actors, will solve the problem.250 Indeed, 
companies and shareholders could replace overcommitted directors with 
candidates better able to focus on their governance responsibilities, and di-
rectors might choose to limit their outside commitments to protect them-
selves from liability. Some commentators, in fact, point to recent declines in 
directors’ outside commitments as evidence that further interventions are 
unnecessary.251 
Private ordering, however, is unlikely to reduce directors’ outside 
commitments to a socially optimal level. Private ordering inadequately re-
strains directors’ overcommitment for four reasons: (1) managers influence 
director selection and may prefer weak monitors, (2) shareholders face 
steep barriers to replacing incumbent directors, (3) bank regulation further 
entrenches existing directors, and (4) directors lack appropriate incentives 
to limit their outside commitments. This Part discusses limitations of private 
ordering and then recommends policies for reform. 
A. Limitations of Private Ordering 
Private ordering alone will not solve the problem of director busyness 
for several reasons. First, management’s influential role in the director se-
lection process exacerbates the overcommitment problem. It is well estab-
lished that inside directors wield outsized influence on the board’s selection 
of director candidates.252 To preserve their autonomy, however, many inside 
directors prefer director candidates who are unlikely to monitor manage-
ment closely.253 When selecting new directors, therefore, managers priori-
tize candidates with many outside commitments who are more likely to be 
lax monitors.254 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 319 (2002) (describing 
private ordering). 
 251 See, e.g., Katherine W. Keally, Public Company Directorships: Are Corporate Directors 
Over the Limit?, NACD DIRECTORSHIP, May–June 2016, at 16, 17 (“[I]mposing a numeric re-
striction on [outside board seats held by] individual director candidates is not the optimal ap-
proach. . . . Most directors are . . . capable of regulating their own time commitments.”). 
 252 See Brown, supra note 27, at 140 (“CEOs invariably serve on the board and are in a posi-
tion to exert influence over the nomination process.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Ac-
countability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 811 (2001) (“Boards self-select, often with strong input from the 
chief executive officer.”); Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of 
Directors: A Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 132 (2008) (“[M]anagement 
effectively controls the corporate ballot.”). 
 253 See Brown, supra note 27, at 138 n.37 (noting that “management dislikes” board monitor-
ing). 
 254 See David A. Becher et al., Board Changes and the Director Labor Market: The Case of 
Mergers 10 (Aug. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/
1805/12176/Becher_2016_board.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH9A-YTST] (“CEOs involved in the 
director selection process are more likely to appoint busy directors, which could be consistent with 
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Corporate governance reforms have attempted to reduce management’s 
influence over director selection by, for instance, prohibiting inside direc-
tors from serving on a company’s nominating committee.255 These reforms, 
however, have not meaningfully limited management’s role in the selection 
process, and inside directors continue to exert disproportionate influence.256 
Opportunities for managerial influence in the director selection process are 
particularly prevalent at large financial institutions, where CEOs over-
whelmingly serve as chair of the board.257 
Second, legal and practical barriers often prevent shareholders from 
replacing overcommitted directors.258 Shareholders of companies that retain 
plurality voting generally cannot defeat a nominee chosen by the board 
without waging a prohibitively expensive proxy contest.259 Even in compa-
nies that have switched to majority voting, defeating an incumbent director 
remains exceedingly rare.260 Of more than 24,000 S&P 1500 director nomi-
                                                                                                                           
the appointment of less valuable monitors.”); see also Judith H. Dobrzynski, Seats on Too Many 
Boards Spell Problems for Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
11/17/business/seats-on-too-many-boards-spell-problems-for-investors.html [https://perma.cc/LQY3-
TGBP] (quoting Professor Charles Elson as saying “[a] CEO who doesn’t want to be monitored 
closely wants a director with lots of board seats”).  
 255 See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04, http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/LCM [https://perma.cc/6PPC-LZ2Y] (providing that listed companies must have a nom-
inating committee composed entirely of independent directors). 
 256 See Brown, supra note 27, at 142 (“Although not a member [of the nominating commit-
tee], the CEO retains the ability to consult with the committee, submit nominees, and veto objec-
tionable candidates.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 127, 159 (2010) (“[N]otwithstanding the creation of independent nominating committees, 
evidence reveals that CEOs continue to influence the director-nomination process through infor-
mal consultations and recommendations of directorial candidates.”); Murphy, supra note 252, at 
148 (“It is clear that CEOs may have the dominant voice in the nominating process even if not 
included in the membership of a nominating committees [sic] composed of independent direc-
tors.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 767 (2002) (“[E]ven when the CEO does not 
sit on the nominating committee, his influence on the nomination process is still generally thought 
to be considerable.”). 
 257 See Laura J. Keller & Katherine Chiglinksy, Wells Fargo Splits Chairman, CEO Roles 
After Account Scandal, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2016, 4:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-12-01/wells-fargo-separates-chairman-and-chief-executive-officer-roles [https://perma.
cc/G6C4-WUN2] (noting that, among the six biggest U.S. banking organizations, all but Citigroup 
and Wells Fargo appoint their CEO as board chair). 
 258 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 48–49 (“[S]hareholders of public corporations lack the 
legal right [and] the practical ability . . . to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful 
monitoring of the corporation’s [directors].”). 
 259 See Brown, supra note 27, at 139–40. In a plurality voting system, a nominee is elected as 
long as he or she receives more votes than a competing candidate. A nominee who runs unop-
posed, therefore, requires only one vote to be elected. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority 
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1124–25 (2016). 
 260 In a majority voting system, a nominee is elected only if he or she receives a majority of 
the votes cast. See Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
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nees subject to majority voting between 2007 and 2013, only eight did not 
receive a majority of votes.261 Most majority voting systems, moreover, do 
not automatically unseat an incumbent director who fails to obtain a majori-
ty. Instead, such a director must only submit his or her resignation, which 
the board is not obligated to accept.262 It is not uncommon for a board to 
retain a director who failed to receive a majority of shareholders’ votes.263 
Corporate election processes, therefore, generally entrench overcommitted 
directors. 
Third, replacing directors is especially difficult for shareholders of 
BHCs, as banking laws perversely entrench sitting directors. Large block 
holders seeking to remove underperforming directors of nonfinancial com-
panies frequently coordinate opposition campaigns.264 Such coordination, 
however, is rarely possible for BHC shareholders. Under the Bank Holding 
Company Act (“BHC Act”), a shareholder or association of shareholders 
that “directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the man-
agement or policies” of the banking organization becomes subject to oner-
ous regulation as a BHC.265 The Federal Reserve Board has interpreted this 
provision strictly. Indeed, in several instances, the Federal Reserve has 
found that a shareholder who attempted to wage a proxy contest against a 
banking organization would “control” the institution and thus become sub-
ject to bank regulation.266 The Federal Reserve’s interpretation of the BHC 
Act’s control provisions thereby dissuades shareholders from seeking to 
replace entrenched directors, as shareholders fear becoming subject to bank-
ing laws.267 
                                                                                                                           
 261 See Choi et al., supra note 259, at 1122. 
 262 See id. 
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 264 See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Big Pension Funds Oppose Election of Six Mylan Directors, 
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bank-holding-company-act/ [https://perma.cc/DT5K-PLW2] (noting that Federal Reserve staff 
have taken the position that a shareholder’s solicitation to elect three of a BHC’s six directors 
could constitute exercise of a controlling influence). 
 267 See Solomon, supra note 266 (arguing that the Federal Reserve’s strict interpretation of 
control “limit[s] shareholder efforts to oust entrenched bank directors” because being subject to 
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Finally, directors themselves will not voluntarily reduce their outside 
commitments to a socially optimal level. Board service and full-time em-
ployment are extraordinarily lucrative for many directors.268 Directors, 
moreover, enjoy enhanced reputations and prestige stemming from outside 
commitments.269 Counteracting these monetary and psychic incentives to 
overcommit, directors face potential legal liability and damaged reputations 
if their firms perform poorly.270 These countervailing forces, however, are 
unlikely to offset directors’ powerful incentives to take on additional outside 
commitments. Claims against directors for failure to monitor are subject to 
exceedingly high legal standards, effectively shielding directors from liabil-
ity.271 Recent evidence further suggests that, in contrast to conventional 
wisdom, outside directors do not suffer reputational consequences when 
their firms perform poorly.272 For many directors, therefore, the benefits of 
overcommitting will continue to outweigh the costs. 
B. Recommendations for Reform 
Private ordering will not solve the problem of director overcommit-
ment in financial companies. Alleviating director overcommitment requires 
something more. This Section proposes a series of reforms targeted to large, 
complex financial institutions. The proposals range from stricter proxy ad-
                                                                                                                           
regulation as a BHC would be “a death knell” for the shareholder); see also Lewkow, supra note 
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 270 See, e.g., Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1109–10; Thomas P. Vartanian, Why Would Any-
one Sane Be a Bank Director?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2017, at A15. 
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administrative enforcement against financial institution directors). 
 272 Compare Steven M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Conse-
quences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 71–72 
(2014) (finding that outside directors of firms that performed poorly during the financial crisis did 
not suffer labor market consequences in the form of lost directorship opportunities at other firms), 
with Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1098–99 (finding that directors of underperforming firms expe-
rience diminished reputations in the form of fewer board seats). 
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visory “overboarding” thresholds to regulatory caps on outside commit-
ments. This Section also recommends safeguards to ensure that the pro-
posed reforms will not deplete the pool of qualified and interested director 
candidates. 
1. Stricter Proxy Advisor Voting Standards 
First, proxy advisory firms should adopt more stringent “overboard-
ing” standards for directors of large, complex financial institutions. The two 
largest proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and 
Glass Lewis, recently lowered the maximum number of outside commit-
ments that a director may hold before being considered “overboarded.”273 
ISS and Glass Lewis now recommend that shareholders vote against any 
director who serves on the board of six or more public companies.274 ISS 
and Glass Lewis, in addition, generally recommend against a director who 
serves as the CEO of a public company and on three or more public compa-
ny boards.275 These revised thresholds—although arguably satisfactory for 
directors of nonfinancial companies276—are still far too high for directors of 
financial firms. 
Proxy advisory firms should adopt an overboarding policy specifically 
for large, complex financial firms. This policy should recommend against 
the election of any director who sits on three or more public company 
boards—the threshold most indicative of when a director becomes distract-
ed.277 Recognizing that full-time employment represents a significant bur-
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Lyuba Goltser & Megan Pendleton, 2017 Proxy Season: ISS and Glass Lewis Update 
Their Voting Policies, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 30, 2016), 
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more public companies (including his or her own). See GLASS LEWIS, supra note 274, at 15. 
 276 Some commenters have criticized the revised standards as inadequate. See, e.g., Keally, 
supra note 251, at 17 (arguing that the threshold reductions “will remain largely inconsequential” 
because “[m]ost directors are already well below these new limits”). 
 277 See Cashman, supra note 106, at 3255 (“[T]he negative association between busy directors 
and firm performance is strongest when the definition of busy is a director serving on three or 
more boards.”). 
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den on a director’s time and attention, the overboarding policy should, in 
addition, recommend against a director who serves as an executive officer 
of a public company and on two or more public company boards (including 
his or her own). Proxy advisory firms should also, at their discretion, rec-
ommend against directors who satisfy these standards but nonetheless are 
overcommitted by virtue of other employment or service on private compa-
ny boards, philanthropic boards, councils, or advisory groups. Finally, 
proxy advisory firms should recommend against the lead independent direc-
tor and members of the nominating committee of a large, complex financial 
company that fails to adequately limit director overcommitment. 
Although shareholders of financial firms face steep barriers to defeat-
ing board nominees,278 a negative recommendation by a proxy advisory 
firm can influence a significant proportion of votes.279 Proxy advisory 
firms’ policies, moreover, encourage companies to adapt their corporate 
governance practices to avoid negative recommendations.280 The proxy ad-
visory firms should bring this power to bear on large, complex financial 
firms by adopting more stringent overboarding standards. 
2. Enhanced Supervisory Assessments 
If financial company directors remain overcommitted despite enhanced 
proxy advisory thresholds, then the financial regulatory agencies should 
adopt policies to address the problem directly. The Federal Reserve, as the 
umbrella supervisor of BHCs and systemically important nonbank financial 
companies, would be best suited to implement policies to limit director 
overcommitment.281 
As an initial step, the Federal Reserve should downgrade a company’s 
supervisory rating if its directors are too overcommitted to monitor risks 
effectively. The Federal Reserve annually evaluates a BHC’s “ability to 
monitor and manage all risks” and assigns a numeric risk management rat-
ing.282 Companies with weak risk management ratings are subject to a va-
                                                                                                                           
 278 See supra notes 252–267 and accompanying text. 
 279 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009) (finding that directors 
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riety of sanctions, including limitations on activities and geographic expan-
sion.283 Although board engagement comprises a portion of the risk man-
agement rating, the current evaluation process does not expressly take into 
account directors’ outside commitments.284 The Federal Reserve should 
begin assigning an unsatisfactory risk management rating to a company if, 
in the Federal Reserve’s supervisory discretion, the company’s directors are 
too busy to execute their governance roles effectively. 
3. Targeted Regulatory Intervention 
As a further step, the Federal Reserve should enact a regulatory cap on 
directors’ outside professional commitments to disqualify extraordinarily 
busy candidates from serving on boards of large, complex financial compa-
nies. In crafting regulatory requirements, the Federal Reserve should look to 
the EU as a model. In 2013, the EU enacted Capital Requirements Directive 
IV (“CRD IV”), limiting the outside commitments of directors of a financial 
institution that is “significant in terms of its size, internal organization and 
the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities.”285 Under CRD IV, 
a director of such a firm may not hold more than four board seats or, if the 
director is a full-time executive, more than two board seats (excluding his 
or her own company).286 These limitations ensure that directors of a finan-
cial institution “allot sufficient time and attention to discharge their duties in 
the institution and thus reduce the riskiness of its activity.”287 
The Federal Reserve should adopt limitations similar to CRD IV to 
eliminate the most severely overcommitted directors of large, complex fi-
nancial companies in the United States. The Federal Reserve’s numeric lim-
it on directorships, however, should be more stringent than under CRD IV. 
EU regulators apply the CRD IV limits to many financial companies, in-
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 284 See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. at 70,446 (noting that the 
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 285 CRD IV, supra note 19, at art. 90. 
 286 See id. 
 287 EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., SINGLE RULEBOOK Q&A, QUESTION 2014_1595 (2014), 
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cluding some with as little as $730 million in assets.288 The Federal Re-
serve, by contrast, typically applies enhanced prudential standards to a 
much more limited set of firms with $50 billion or more in assets, and it 
reserves its most stringent standards for the nine SIFIs.289 Accordingly, the 
Federal Reserve should prohibit directors of a BHC with $50 billion or 
more in assets or a systemically important nonbank financial company from 
serving on the board of more than three public companies or, if the director 
is a public company executive, more than two public companies (including 
his or her own). 
The Federal Reserve should go beyond CRD IV and adopt additional 
restrictions for key directors. The directorship limitations in CRD IV apply 
uniformly to all members of a financial institution’s board.290 As discussed 
above, however, some financial institution directors bear special responsi-
bility for ensuring the firm’s safety and soundness. A firm’s lead independ-
ent director, risk committee chair, and audit committee chair, in particular, 
are critical to effective risk management.291 These directors, therefore, 
should be uniquely focused on the firm. The Federal Reserve should estab-
lish more stringent restrictions for the three key directors of each SIFI. Spe-
cifically, the Federal Reserve should limit SIFI lead independent directors, 
risk committee chairs, and audit commitment chairs to serving on the board 
of one other public company. The Federal Reserve, moreover, should not 
permit a current public company executive to serve in one of these key 
leadership roles, as it is unlikely that a sitting executive would be able to 
devote sufficient time and attention to the role. 
4. Increased Director Compensation 
There is, of course, a tension between trying to attract the strongest 
and most highly qualified directors for large, complex financial companies 
and limiting their outside professional commitments. Director candidates 
already complain that serving on a financial company’s board is unattractive 
                                                                                                                           
 288 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK, IFPRU § 1.2.3 (2014), https://www.hand
book.fca.org.uk/handbook/IFPRU/1/2.html [https://perma.cc/NAL6-Q734] (applying CRD IV 
limits on directorships to investment firms with total assets exceeding £530 million). 530 million 
pounds is equivalent to approximately 744 million U.S. dollars as of February 2018. 
 289 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) 
(directing the Federal Reserve to adopt enhanced risk management requirements for BHCs with 
more than $50 billion in assets and systemically important nonbank financial companies that in-
crease in stringency based on the institution’s systemic importance). In December 2017, the Sen-
ate Banking Committee passed a bipartisan bill that would increase the enhanced prudential stand-
ard threshold to $250 billion in assets. S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 401 (2018). 
 290 See CRD IV, supra note 19. 
 291 See Tarullo, supra note 47 (emphasizing the importance of a firm’s lead independent di-
rector, risk committee chair, and audit committee chair). 
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due to onerous regulations and potential liability.292 Imposing limits on di-
rectors’ outside commitments is likely to further dissuade well-qualified 
candidates from serving.293 The Federal Reserve can limit the depletion of 
qualified and interested director candidates by applying the most stringent 
regulatory caps only to key SIFI directors—less than thirty directors in to-
tal—as previously suggested. Further safeguards may be needed, however, 
to ensure a consistent supply of well-qualified candidates who are willing to 
comply with limits on their professional obligations. 
To that end, large, complex financial companies should substantially 
increase directors’ pay to compensate them for foregone professional oppor-
tunities. Financial firms already compensate their directors generously. In-
deed, in 2017, average outside director compensation among the eight U.S. 
G-SIBs ranged from $275,000 at Bank of New York Mellon to more than 
$600,000 at Goldman Sachs.294 Large financial companies, however, gener-
ally cap their board members’ compensation to deter shareholder litigation 
over directors’ earnings.295 
Directors are likely to require higher pay if they are going to be subject 
to limits on their outside engagements.296 Key SIFI directors, in particular, 
should receive substantial raises in exchange for severely limiting their out-
side board seats. To align directors’ interests with those of other stakehold-
ers in the firm, financial companies should, to the extent possible, structure 
enhanced pay packages in compliance with compensation guidelines pro-
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posed by the financial regulatory agencies for executives and significant 
risk takers.297 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that busy directors detract from effective gov-
ernance at large financial institutions. These institutions, by virtue of their 
complexity and systemic importance, require enhanced monitoring from 
their boards—oversight that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. The 
directors of the United States’ largest and most complex financial institu-
tions, however, remain alarmingly busy. Preserving the safety and sound-
ness of the financial system, therefore, requires that financial company di-
rectors—and especially those with key board leadership positions—reduce 
their outside commitments. This Article has proposed a series of reforms to 
ensure that financial company directors focus on their governance responsi-
bilities. The reforms outlined in this Article will enhance oversight of man-
agement, deter misconduct and excessive risk-taking, and—potentially—
help prevent the next financial crisis. 
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